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Preface
"Life among the Lowly" is the XIX century best-seller which strongly con-
tributed to the anti-slavery movement. Certainly, it denounced the life and
labour conditions of black slaves, but it also inspired some stereotypes on
black people that still survive today. These two faces of the novel are con-
tained in the present dissertation.
The first chapter "Hate at First Sight? Dynamic Aspects of the Elec-
toral Impact of Migrations: the Case of the UK and Brexit" analyses how
native political preferences are influenced by the presence of foreigners in a
neighbourhood. The last European and U.S. election campaigns hinged on
the migration issue and we argue that the preferences expressed through the
vote might reflect some prejudicial attitudes. Instead, the second and third
chapters refer to the impact of immigration on the domestic labour market.
"Need for Flexibility or Subsidies? Reviewing the Impact of Immigration
on the Domestic Labour Market" reviews all the seminal papers that have
contributed to understand the effect of immigrant workers on native labour
market conditions. The conclusion of this literature sustains a non negative
impact of foreign labour supply on native average wage. According to these
studies this effect is achieved more easily when the labour market is flexible
and workers can nimbly change their occupations. Nonetheless, the crucial
hypothesis of all the analysis is a perfect elastic capital supply. Studies on
the reaction of investments to an increase in the immigrant labour-force are
still rather scant and we try to improve the knowledge on the underlying
dynamics in the last chapter. "The Labour Demand Response to Supply
Shocks. The Indirect Effect of Immigration" investigates how industries and
firms production decisions are influenced by migration inflows. The general
conclusion, as suggested by the title of the review, is that policy makers
should pay attention to industrial policies and not only to labour market
structure.
In particular, previous studies on the impact of foreign-born population
on native voting preferences have highlighted a positive effect of immigration
on the electoral consensus for right-wing parties. Nonetheless, this result
holds with some caveats. To overcome the limit of the existing literature
we formulate the hypothesis that an anti-immigrant attitude rises only at
the arrival of the migration inflows and disappears some period later. At
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the basis of such a dynamics there could be material concerns about the
adjustment costs of the new population or some prejudices, both denoting
an "hate at first sight effect". To measure this potential mechanism we
use an approach based on the standard network instrument which robustly
supports our hypothesis.
With regard to the analysis on the labour market, neglecting the reaction
of investments to an increase in the labour supply can lead to some mislead-
ing policy conclusions. Our contribution to the literature is to explicitly
looking at the labour demand side of the market. Furthermore, contrary to
the existing studies, the data that we use allow us to conduct the analysis at
the firm level. We then avoid the bias that originates from the heterogene-
ity of production units within industries. The data refer to an important
case-study such that of Italy. Although it is only a landing country for most
migrants, inflows increased tremendously from 2007, deserving a specific at-
tention from academics. The result of the empirical analysis – conducted
by means of the network instrument – highlights that immigrant labour-
force has been largely absorbed by the adoption of more labour-intensive
technologies.
The layout with which we present the different studies depicts the order
of priorities that in our opinion policy makers should follow. From the very
beginning of the refugee crisis the economic analysis has been used in order
to find political answers. Public attitudes in favour of solidarity have been
linked to the ability of the market in absorbing the population shock. In
doing that few attention has been given to the potential effect of the phe-
nomenon on the political stability and social cohesion. On the contrary, we
expect that public actors would build a community around shared values
and consequently design the policies to overcome the market failures.
3
Chapter 1
Hate at First Sight? Dynamic
Aspects of the Electoral
Impact of Migrations: the Case
of the UK and Brexit
Recent studies provide evidence that immigration has a significant posi-
tive effect on the vote for parties with anti-immigration agendas. However,
this result does not emerge if we apply the same empirical analysis to the
UK, whether in the case of Brexit, or if we consider support for Ukip or the
political intentions expressed in the BES survey. To account for this and
other fragmented evidence in the literature on personal attitudes towards
immigration, we formulate the hypothesis that anti-immigration views re-
sulting from the presence of immigrants in a neighbourhood is a temporary
effect. Different underlying mechanisms may be at the root of such negative
short-run effects, such as material concerns about the adjustment costs of
new migration flows, or prejudicial attitudes, both denoting a “hate at first
sight” effect. We build an econometric strategy to test for the existence of
such a short-run effect in the case of Brexit and then assess the robustness
of our result using a panel of the vote for Ukip and individual data from the
BES survey. The evidence robustly supports our hypothesis and provides a
basis for further analysis.
This chapter is part of a research project with Eugenio Levi (Sapienza University of
Rome) and Fabrizio Patriarca (Roma Tre University).
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1.1 Introduction
Immigration has recently become a key issue in European and US public
debate. Though hardly a new topic, immigration has gained a significant
role on the political agenda and has influenced voting preferences in var-
ious recent elections. Recent studies (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone
et al., 2016; Dustmann et al., 2016; Steinmayr, 2016; Halla et al., 2017)
have investigated the causal role of immigration on voting, i.e. how indi-
vidual voting preferences are influenced by the stock of immigrants in the
neighbourhood. Most of them provide evidence that living in an area with
a higher number of immigrants increases the probability of voting for par-
ties that promote tighter immigration policies. Nevertheless, a minority of
these studies yield the opposite result for recent elections (Steinmayr, 2016;
Colantone and Stanig, 2016), and the literature that has focused directly
on natives’ attitudes towards immigration, rather than on voting, has not
observed a significant effect caused by the stock of foreign-born individuals
(Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Card et al., 2005). Anecdotal evidence relating
to the latest US Presidential Election points in the same direction.1 Fur-
thermore, among the findings of the present paper, we provide evidence that
if we apply the methodology used in previous literature, the positive cor-
relation between current immigration and anti-immigration positions is not
confirmed in the case of the UK. Here neither the case of Brexit nor support
for the UK Independence Party (Ukip), nor the political intentions expressed
in the British Election Study (BES) questionnaires provide evidence of such
an impact being produced by the immigrant stock.
Basing ourselves on this puzzling framework, we formulate the hypoth-
esis that increased opposition to immigration is a temporary effect. The
effect of recent immigrant flows may be different than that produced by the
overall stock of immigrants. In other words, the time dimension may hold
the key to understanding the way immigration affects voting preferences.
Disentangling these two effects is our paper’s main innovation, and will give
us insights into how immigration impacts political outcomes that could have
relevant policy implications. Different underlying mechanisms may be at the
root of such negative short-run effects, such as material concerns about the
adjustment cost of new migrant inflows (the early phases of new immigrant
integration), or prejudicial attitudes (initial attitudes not confirmed by ex-
perience), both denoting a “hate at first sight” effect. With regard to the
former, it is important to note that integration does not happen overnight.
In fact, initially immigration can place increased pressure on the welfare sys-
tem and labour market, causing natives to react with hostility to the new
immigrant flows. Over time, as local authorities and the native population
1http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2016/11/support-trump-strongest-where-
illegal-immigration-lowest, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/opinion/identity-over-
ideology.html
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learn to cope with the process, a potential initial situation of distress may
be mitigated. The extensive literature that analyses personal attitudes to
immigration has pointed out the negative attitudes regarding the effects of
immigration on the labour market, on crime and on cultural homogeneity
(e.g. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Card et al., 2005). These attitudes may
not reflect the effects of immigration, but may simply represent perceptions
influenced by a failure to anticipate the immigrants’ integration.
In the case of prejudicial attitudes, Arrow et al. (1973) suggests that in-
dividuals only resort to stereotyping immigrants when they lack information
on their habits, customs and traditions. Therefore, as soon as direct infor-
mation on the new immigrant neighbours is acquired, the negative attitude
produced by their presence should cease. A similar argument is that political
narratives on immigration may be more effective where immigration is more
recent, as recent changes in the composition of a neighbourhood’s population
may make them more salient.
The fact that the perception of attitudes towards immigration are an
issue in themselves is supported by evidence showing that the extent of
the immigration (as a whole) is habitually overestimated. In the case of
the UK (Mori, 2016), British citizens think that an average of 15% of UK
residents were born in another European country (the figure grows to 20%
among Brexiters), while the actual figure is only 5%. Moreover, they think
that European citizens make up only 25% of the immigrant population as a
whole, whereas the actual figure is 37%.
A recent multi-country experiment has confirmed how this powerful bias
is also at work in other receiving countries (Grigorieff et al., 2016). Moreover,
when subjects are provided with correct information on immigrant popula-
tion proportions, their attitudes towards them immediately and permanently
become more positive.
There is therefore already evidence to suggest that a process of learn-
ing about immigration may occur over time, mitigating the “hate at first
sight” effect. This opens up a new area for analysis: i.e. how the resulting
prejudicial attitudes are formed and how they can be overcome.
The short-run negative effects of new immigration flows can be tested
by examining whether areas of more recent immigration return more anti-
immigrant votes than areas where immigration has a longer history. From
this analysis, we may derive some insight as to why previous studies offer
contradictory results. Furthermore, the fact that migration to larger urban
centres generally goes back further than migration to more rural areas may
account for the differences we observe in the effects of immigration in these
two different contexts.
Our case study is the 2016 UK Referendum on the country’s membership
of the European Union. We start from the hypothesis that people’s views on
immigration played a major role in the victory of “Leave” over “Remain”, i.e.
the victory of the Brexit camp. In figure 1.1 we show the Google News Trend
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Figure 1.1: Google Trends in UK by Topic
index for three different topics: immigration, unemployment and industry.
Unlike in the case of the two other topics, in the days preceding recent
elections (the May 2014 European Elections and the General Election of May
2015) a surge of interest over immigration can be observed, which disappears
shortly afterwards. This Index reaches its highest peak during the weeks
leading up to the referendum on EU membership.
An Ipsos MORI poll from June 2016 offers reasons to think that non-
rational beliefs played a substantial role in the framing of the referendum.
The research company reported that 33% of subjects said they would decide
how to vote in the referendum based on the issue of the number of immigrants
entering Britain, whereas more than 28% said they would base their decision
on economic concerns. Only 12% reported that their decision would be
nationalism-related. Some commentators state explicitly that the Brexit
result was more about xenophobia than Europe.
If we take these reports seriously, the referendum gives us an opportunity
to observe the effects of immigration on the popular vote. Nonetheless,
in Scotland and Northen Ireland the question of Britain’s membership of
European Union has been framed not only by the issue of immigration.
Political relationship between them and England may have played a major
role. This is why we focus our analysis to England and Wales.
To assess whether there is a short-run and a long-run effect of immi-
gration we relate the percentage of votes for "Remain" to the current and
the past percentage of immigrants in the region. In doing this we can face
some endogeneity issues. In particular, we concern about endogenous sort-
ing of migrants which can avoid areas with anti-immigration attitudes. To
deal with this, we use estimation methodology common to recent literature
(Halla et al., 2017; Barone et al., 2016) using the instrument proposed by
Altonji and Card (1991), which looks at the network between immigrants. In
fact, immigrants tend to move where individual of the same ethnicity already
settle in order to to share the costs related to the movement (Bartel, 1989).
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The exogeneiy assumption is that local conditions that attracted immigrants
in the distant past are uncorrelated with more recent political preferences.
Data supports our hypothesis, confirming that the effect of immigration on
voting is a dynamic process. The short-run effect has a stronger negative
impact than the long-run effect.
To validate our results, we carry out robustness checks using two strate-
gies: we analyse votes for Ukip, an extreme right wing party, in the 2004,
2009 and 2014 European Elections, using panel estimations with instrumen-
tal variables; then we analyse individual data on personal attitudes towards
immigration and votes for Ukip and Brexit from the British Election Study.
In the next section, we begin by providing a review of the literature on the
political effects of immigration and discrimination. We then offer an overview
of the Brexit case, focusing on the political impact of the immigration issue,
before moving on to the econometric analysis in section 1.4. The final section
presents our conclusions.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is related first and foremost to a literature looking at the effects
of immigration on electoral outcomes. Most studies belonging to this branch
(Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone et al., 2016; Dustmann et al., 2016; Halla
et al., 2017) find a positive correlation between the flow of immigrants to a
region and votes for parties with clear anti-immigration agendas. It should
be noted, however, that these results are not without caveats. For instance,
the panel dataset covering six general elections in Austria - on which Halla
et al. (2017) base their work - allows the authors to break down the effect for
each round of voting. What they find is that [. . . ] the immigrants’ cultural
distance to Austrian society mattered (only) at the beginning of the sample
period.2
More importantly, big cities are observed to behave differently in all the
studies. Barone et al. (2016) suggest three alternative explanations for this
pattern. Firstly, urban areas are characterised by a more highly skilled pop-
ulation.3 A well-known result that emerges from the studies on natives’
attitudes towards immigration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006;
Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Card et al., 2012) is that natives may perceive
immigrants with skill sets similar to their own as producing greater com-
petition in the labour market. Given that immigration to the European
countries is mainly unskilled, support for parties with an anti-immigration
agenda will therefore tend to emerge among the low-skilled native popula-
tion. Of note is the fact that the singularity of big cities holds even when
2Halla et al. (2017) p. 5
3In the Italian dataset of Barone et al. (2016), the share of graduates in urban munic-
ipalities is about double that of the population living elsewhere.
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controlling for the skill-composition of the population. Secondly, large ur-
ban areas contain more segmented neighbourhoods. Natives benefit from
the positive effects of immigration (e.g. cheaper personal services), while
they do not perceive any negative side effects, such as social segregation,
crime or competition for local amenities. Otto and Steinhardt (2014) , how-
ever, focus on the city districts of Hamburg (Germany) and what they find
contradicts this hypothesis. What emerges from their disaggregated level of
analysis is that immigrants induce changes in neighbourhoods and schools,
and that districts with a higher concentration of immigrant children produce
significantly higher shares of votes for extreme right-wing parties. Thirdly,
"immigration in big cities may have started sooner than in small munici-
palities".4 The process of integrating a foreign population into a receiving
society takes time. Social and economic frictions may emerge at the begin-
ning, but once the immigrant community has settled, additional inflows do
not lead to further changes in natives’ attitudes. Most studies on the effects
of immigration on voting behaviour make use of a panel data model, which
fails to capture such dynamics. As we will discuss in further detail later, an
analysis with fixed effects can show the effect of a variation in the number
of immigrants on the change in the number of votes, regardless of the size or
history of an existing foreign community. Our idea is that a direct experience
of the phenomenon of immigration triggers a learning and adjustment pro-
cess that mitigates the initial hostility. In the same vein, Steinmayr (2016) –
the only one to find a negative correlation between the presence of refugees
and the share of votes for extreme right-wing parties – interprets his results
in the light of the contact theory (Allport, 1954).
In our study we also refer to social psychology and behavioural economics
to better analyse how the presence of immigrants affects natives’ attitudes.
Allport (1954) is among the social psychologists who maintain that the meet-
ing of different identities does not necessarily trigger social conflict. While
"groupness" originates as a survival strategy, rather than emerging from
intergroup comparisons, the primary behaviour associated with groups is
ingroup favouritism (Brewer, 1999). Individuals share stronger social prefer-
ences with members of the same group while not necessarily discriminating
against members of other groups. In the absence of specific motives for out-
group hate, individuals from different groups interact only as individuals.5
The results of experiments conducted on cooperation and group identity are
consistent with this theory (Ahmed, 2007; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2009).
However, other factors may be at work in the interaction between indi-
viduals with different identities. One of these is statistical discrimination
(Arrow et al., 1973). When individuals do not possess sufficient informa-
4Barone et al. (2016) p. 7
5There is some evidence that points in the opposite direction. For example, subjects dis-
criminate against outgroups in trust games with minimal group identity (Hargreaves Heap
and Zizzo, 2009).
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tion on the habits, customs and traditions of another group, they resort
to stereotypes. There is evidence that this is indeed the case where ethnic
differences are concerned. In one experiment (Castillo and Petrie, 2010) sub-
jects had to express their preferences for partners for a cooperation game. In
one test, they only knew the ethnic group of their potential partner (Black,
White, Asian, etc.). In the other, they had additional information on the
potential partner’s behaviour in a previous cooperation game. Castillo and
Petrie (2010) found discrimination at work against subjects from Black eth-
nic groups when the ethnic group was the only piece of information available.
However, discrimination disappeared in the test where people were provided
with additional information. These results support the hypothesis that prej-
udice can be used to explain discrimination. It also implies that individuals
provided with sufficient individual-level information on the members of an-
other group may overcome discrimination.
Another factor behind discrimination is the belief that there is a differ-
ence in status between the individual’s group and another one. In this case,
not only do people want to favour their own group, but also to maintain the
perceived positive distinctiveness they associate with it (Tajfel and Turner,
1979). From this point of view, immigrants can be perceived as a threat,
particularly if there is competition between groups over resources (Sherif
et al., 1961; Campbell, 1965). Some support for this thesis comes from an
experiment using an inter-group conflict game in which subjects were found
to over-contribute to their own group in order to sustain intergroup conflict,
even when this behaviour resulted in highly inefficient outcomes when com-
pared to their behaviour when playing as individuals (Abbink et al., 2010).
Where there is conflict over resources, inefficient competition between groups
can be a lasting factor.
A recent contribution by Sekeris and Vasilakis (2016) on the impact of
the refugee crisis on the Greek elections highlights the effects of pure xeno-
phobia. The context of the analysis and the timing of the vote offer an
explanation for the effects of immigrant arrivals in a municipality in terms
of the discriminatory attitudes of the receiving population. The present
study also considers immigrant flows. However, by also taking into account
the stock of immigrants in a region, our analysis can shed a light on the
dynamic aspects of the political impact of immigration.
1.3 The case of Brexit
1.3.1 Politics and immigration in the UK
Right from the very beginning of the national debate on the Referendum
on UK membership of the European Union, the "Leave" option – which
would eventually prevail on 23rd June 2016 with 17,410,742 votes, just under
52% –was linked to the issue of immigration. The two topics were linked
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throughout the discussion, by both public actors and the media.
During his campaign for the 2015 General Election, David Cameron com-
mitted to calling a referendum on UK membership of the EU and renewed
the Conservatives’ pledge on immigration targets. Indeed, his manifesto for
the 2010 election was to ". . . take steps to take net migration back to the
levels of the 1990’s".6 "No ifs. No buts" was the slogan of the pledge to
reduce entries to 100,000 per year. As a result of stricter controls on "bo-
gus" colleges and a rationing of visas for non-EU citizens, immigration did
begin to fall in 2011. Nevertheless, the ongoing economic crisis, which has
led to a general increase in migration flows all over Europe, and the end-
ing of European transitional arrangements for the free movement of workers
from Bulgaria and Romania inverted the trend. Eurosceptics took advan-
tage of David Cameron’s failure to keep his promise and Nigel Farage used
it as proof of Britain’s limited ability to control its own borders as long as
it remained a member of the EU.
The composition of the current population of the UK reflects immigra-
tion flows to Great Britain since the independence of the Republic of Ireland
in 1922. During World War II, due to the need for a greater workforce,
the government chose not to introduce restrictions on inflows. Particularly
significant was the arrival of individuals coming from the Commonwealth
and other countries and regions that were previously part of the British Em-
pire – particularly India, Pakistan and the Caribbean. At that time, these
people all held British passports and they established important communi-
ties throughout Britain, such as the Indian community in London and the
Pakistani ones in Birmingham and Bradford.
Another important source of economic migration was the Guest Work-
ers Programme, under which many Polish and Ukrainian citizens moved to
the UK. These were unskilled workers and were expected to settle only tem-
porarily. Immigration from Europe began to rise in 2004 and today European
citizens living in the UK represent 37% of the total immigrant population.
Less relevant in the history of the UK are asylum seekers arriving under the
UN 1951 Refugee Convention.7
Cultural and social concerns about the growth of the foreign population
already existed among the conservative electorate, but the shift in legislation
happened with the vast increase in unemployment during the 1970’s. The
British Nationality Act 1981 – in force since 1983 – distinguished between
British citizens and British Overseas Territories citizens. It also changed the
way nationality is inherited, thereby limiting the number of immigrants and
their children who could enter and live in Great Britain.
Another significant change was the points-based immigration system,
6http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/04/theresa-mays-devotion-to-david-
camerons-net-migration-target-is
7OECD (2017)
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introduced in 2006 for workers and students coming from outside Europe.
Immigration to the UK has become officially managed and highly educated
individuals who bring skills which are in short supply in the UK are favoured.
As previously mentioned, in 2010 Mr Cameron’s government imposed further
restrictions on visas, namely on the quota of non-EU visas, and increased
controls over immigration. What comes next is part of the current debate.
1.3.2 The framing of the European issue
Data from the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS) offers some evidence of
the existence of a link between attitudes to immigration and people’s atti-
tudes towards the European Union (Table 1.1). We analyse UK data from
the 2014 survey, excluding observations from Northern Ireland and Scot-
land. There are two questions in this survey that capture people’s attitudes
towards the European Union. The first, concerning people’s trust in the
European Parliament, asks: "Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much
you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not
trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly,
how much do you personally trust the European Parliament?" The second
one concerns the process of European unification. It says: "Now thinking
about the European Union, some say European unification should go fur-
ther. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number
on the scale best describes your position?". At the lower extreme, i.e. 0,
the answer corresponds to "Unification already gone too far"; at the upper
extreme, i.e. 10, to "Unification should go further". This second question
is basically "Leave" or "Remain" with a wider number of options and with
less prominence given to the actual choices.
We find that self-reported attitudes towards Europe show a high correla-
tion to issues relating to immigration, the economy and trust in the national
government, as we observed in the Ipsos MORI poll at the beginning of
this paper. We also find moderate but highly significant correlations with
watching TV, with subjective happiness and with trust in other people. If
we perform the same analysis for other European countries, we find more or
less the same set of correlations with comparable magnitudes. Here we only
report results from Germany, but these are consistent with those observed in
France and Italy. This suggests that people’s attitudes towards the European
Union do not depend on country-level political debates, but on some deeper
mechanism. Therefore, the model we have suggested might capture not only
a uniquely British attitude towards immigration and Europe, but rather a
specific combination of psychological mechanisms and political conditions
that seem to be at play in Europe during present times.
Our elaborations on European Social Survey data, 2014 wave.
There is a difference between the answers to the two questions on Europe.
While correlations between trust in the European Parliament and the state
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Table 1.1: ESS: framing over the European Union topic
Trust in the European European
European Parliament unification unification (Germany)
How satisfied with present state of economy 0.30∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
How satisfied with the national government 0.35∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
TV watching -0.17∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
TV watching, news/politics/current affairs -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗
How happy are you 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful 0.26∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
Allow immigrants from poorer countries in Europe -0.34∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗
Allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe -0.31∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗
Immigration bad or good for country’s economy 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs 0.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live 0.32∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
How religious are you 0.12∗∗∗ 0.03 0.10∗∗∗
How close do you feel to the country -0.11∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.00
Employment contract unlimited or limited duration 0.01 0.04∗ 0.01
N 1993
Authors’ elaboration on European Social Survey data, 2014 wave
of the economy or trust in the national government are over 30%, they lower
to 13% if we consider the unification process instead. This may be because
the answers to the former question are highly correlated to answers on trust
in the national parliament (coefficient: 0.53; p-value: 0.00). Immigration
issues are the only ones that remain highly correlated over both questions.
It should be noted that this survey was carried out before the 2015 refugee
crisis. Therefore, such correlations cannot be driven by the border control
emergency and the sense of panic that derived from that situation. Fur-
thermore, there seems to be no great difference in the correlations between
attitudes towards immigrants from Europe and to those from the rest of
the world. Answers to these two questions show an 83% correlation. It is
therefore not welfare or labour considerations related to European legislation
on internal migration or social rights that are responsible for this. Overall,
the answers to all questions on immigration show a high level of mutual
correlation, supporting the hypothesis that it is not a specific immigration-
related economic phenomenon that drives the effect of migration on political
preferences over Europe.
1.4 Econometric analysis
1.4.1 Econometric strategy
Our econometric strategy extends the methodology used in previous studies,
particularly in Barone et al. (2016), by analysing the effect of both current
and past immigration on natives’ voting behaviour. In general, the estimat-
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ing equation considered in previous literature can be written as:
yit = α+ βmit + δxit + it (1.1)
where yit is the share of votes for anti-immigration parties or policies in
region i at time t, mit is the stock of immigrants (i.e. the number of immi-
grants divided by the native population), xit is a vector of control variables,
and it is the error term.
According to our hypothesis, for the same stock of immigrants we should
observe a preference for tighter immigration polices where the phenomenon
is more recent. Therefore, we need to build an econometric strategy to test
for short-run and long-run effects of immigration. We turn this idea into a
formula by adding to equation 1.1 the effect of immigration at time t− 1:8
yit = α+ βmit + γmi,t−1δxit + it (1.2)
We test whether the coefficient γ is negative and lower than β. Indeed,
in our estimation we consider yit to be the share of votes for "Remain" over
"Leave", and thus the coefficient must be read with the opposite sign.
We can impose a structure on coefficients so the previous equation turns
into the unbounded version of the following model:
yit = α+ βmit + γ∆mit + δxit + it (1.3)
which can also be written as:
yit = α+ (β + γ)mit − γm(i,t−1) + δxit + it (1.4)
If this model depicts the true dynamic of immigration and votes, equa-
tion (1.1) results to be biased. Indeed, in the case of OLS, the mean of the
estimated coefficient of the current stock of immigrants is [β + γ(1− ρ∆x)],
where ρ∆m is the time autocorrelation of immigration flows. In other words,
the estimation of equation (1.1) gives a coefficient which depends on a com-
bination of two different effects, that of the stock and that of the flow. If
the two effects have opposite sign, the bias may also reverse the sign of the
estimated coefficient.
An alternative way to test for the negative short-run effect is to leave
aside the stock of immigration and to consider a Finite Distributed Lag
equation of the flows:
yit = α+γ0∆mit+γ1∆m(i,t−1)+γ2∆m(i,t−2)+· · ·+γL∆miL+δxit+it (1.5)
As in a standard case of a FDL equation, we impose a structure to the
coefficients which is consistent with our underlying theoretical hypothesis,
i.e. the distinction between the short-run and the long-run:
8Multicollinearity has been tested. Results are available on request
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γ0 = λ+ σ; γ1 = λ+
1
2
σ; γ2 = λ+
1
3
σ; . . . ; γL = λ+
1
(1 + L)
σ (1.6)
where l is the lag, λ corresponds to the long-run effect (cfr. β in equa-
tion 1.3), while σ is the short-run effect (cfr. γ in equation 1.3) - which is
decreasing with the number of lags. We can compute the following auxiliary
variables:
m˜i1 = ∆mit + ∆m(i,t−1) + ∆m(i,t−2) + · · ·+ ∆miL
m˜i2 = ∆mit +
1
2
∆m(i,t−1) +
1
3
∆m(i,t−2) + · · ·+
1
(1 + L)
∆xiL
and we can write equation (1.4) as:
yit = α+ λmi1 + σmi2 + δxit + it (1.7)
Equation (1.7) justifies the exclusion of the stock ofm from the regression
model. We will estimate the model in (1.7) as a further robustness analysis.
The vector of control variables x includes many possible determinants of
the Brexit vote, recalled in the literature previously reviewed. Our analysis
is at NUTS3 level, thus, in addition to the regional (NUTS2) fixed effects, we
also introduced some local-unit specific controls: controls for the economic
situation, such as per-capita income and unemployment; a variable captur-
ing the effect of the urban feature, which embodies the effect of London and
similar urban contexts; the socio-demographic structure represented by the
share of the population aged over 65 and the share of the population with
a higher level of education. An important body of previous literature (Card
and DiNardo, 2000; Borjas, 2006; Peri and Sparber, 2008) argues that cross-
regional analyses are invalidated by the fact that natives decide to relocate
in response to immigration flows. In our case, the effect of a negative senti-
ment relating to immigration may have pushed natives to migrate internally,
thus reducing the number of people voting "Leave" in the areas with a high
concentration of immigrants. There is very scant evidence of the so-called
skating rink model, according to which "each new immigrant knocks a na-
tive off the ice". However, we consider net internal migration flows in our
empirical strategy to control for such potential bias. In particular, we distin-
guish between internal migrations of natives and foreign-born citizens, and
we regress the net flows of natives on the flows of immigrants. Then, we use
the fitted values, i.e. the relocation decisions of natives due only to immi-
gration, as a control. Finally, we also consider the results of the 1975 UK
referendum on the European Union. In this way, we further control, at the
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1975 county council level, that the effect of immigration is not endogenously
related to past historical attitudes towards Europe.
The analysis concerns England and Wales and it is performed at the
Local Administrative Unit Level (LAU1) for a total of 345 territorial units.
From the total 348 territorial units we have excluded the LAU of the City of
London (which is a small subset of what is commonly considered as London’s
financial district) since, curiously, no correspondent data on immigration is
available. We also exclude the Isles of Scilly and the Isle of Wight, for which
income estimates are missing.
For recent immigration flows we consider the relative and absolute vari-
ations in the stock of immigrants for the period 2012-2015. This is a period
not characterised by major political changes and we purposely avoided the
years of the economic crisis.
The source for electoral data is the UK Electoral Commission while the
other data is derived from the Office for National Statistics. Immigration,
Income and Unemployment data are model-based estimates. Unemployment
is the estimated rate at March 2016 by the Regional Labour Market Statistics
office of the ONS. The other control variables are the latest available esti-
mates at LAU level (2011) by the Ness (Neighbourhood Statistics), except
for net internal migration flows data, which derives from the Internal Migra-
tion Dataset and refers to 2015. The dummy for the Cosmopolitan Areas
concerns 50 local authorities which, in the classification for the 2011 Census,
were included by the ONS in the three categories of London Cosmopoli-
tan Central, London Cosmopolitan Suburbia and Business and Education
Centres.
1.4.2 Identification strategy
Comparisons between areas with different concentrations of immigrants are
always problematic, as immigration flows can be endogenous to the phe-
nomenon under analysis. Two issues in the previous body of the literature
provide concerns with regard to endogeneity. Firstly, immigrants could avoid
areas with anti-immigrant sentiments. The implication would be an upward
bias in the effect of immigration on political outcomes. In areas with more
tolerant attitudes the stock of immigrants would be higher than the expected
stock predicted purely by push factors, which would in turn lead to an under-
estimation of the positive effect of immigration on votes for anti-immigrant
agendas. Secondly, if there are underlying factors in an area that drive both
sorting decisions and political preferences, there would be some spurious
correlation between the effect of these factors and the effect of immigration.
For example, Halla et al. (2017) suggest that an increase in votes for right-
wing parties could be the result of a shift to greater pro-business attitudes. If
these attitudes in turn determine a better economic performance in that area
compared to other areas, it would create a pull factor for sorting decisions
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by immigrants. More generally, structural changes in the economy create
the conditions for both a political shift in preferences and the emergence
of a pull factor for immigration. This correlation could determine both an
upward and a downward bias on the effect of immigration on political out-
comes. The direction of the bias would depend on the relation between this
underlying factor and political preferences.
The sorting problem can be overcome by using an instrumental variable
approach. An important body of literature argues that immigrants choose
where to locate according to individual networks as well as job opportunities
(e.g. Beine and Coulombe, 2014; Mayda, 2010). In other words, the location
choices of people who are moving for economic reasons are driven by utility
maximization strategies, which include the sharing of information to reduce
the costs of migration, as well as spending time with people that speak the
same language and share the same culture. Then, we exploit the tendency
of migrants to move to areas where people from the same country already
live (Bartel, 1989) and we predict the actual distribution of the foreign pop-
ulation by observing the past one. Therefore, we make use of the instrument
suggested by Altonji and Card (1991), as slightly modified by Cortés and
Pan (2014) and Barone et al. (2016):
Immit =
∑
n λ
t−l
in Immnt,−1
Popti
where Immit is the predicted share of current immigrants in region i.
It is equal to the number of immigrants coming from group n at time t at
country level, net of contribution of region i to the total, apportioned to the
fraction of people coming from the same country and living in region i at
time t− l; all aggregated to the main foreign nationalities present in UK.
This instrument is exogenous at one condition. The time t − l chosen
must be such that unobserved variables that determine voting today are
not correlated with the determinants of immigration in that year. In other
words, the historical sorting decisions of immigrants at that time need to be
exogenous to current political preferences.
To validate this condition, we proceed, in line with previous studies, to
the choice of a year t − l preceding a major change in political attitudes
relating to the issue of immigration. We consider three aspects: major po-
litical changes such as the emergence of new parties; substantial increases
in migration flows; and changes in the role of immigration in the political
debate. Taking all these aspects into consideration, for the case of the UK
we chose 1981 and 1991, with the latter year being used only when we needed
two instruments in the same estimation.
The year 1991 precedes the Labour governments of the 1990s. In the case
of 1981, we further expand our time horizon right back to the beginning of
the Thatcher years. In 1991, extreme right-wing parties received well below
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1% of electoral preferences, whereas now they receive over 15%. Ukip, a
nationalist right-wing party that was at the forefront of the Brexit campaign
with an anti-immigration agenda, was founded only in 1993. Moreover, it
started as a Eurosceptic party and only later in the 2000s proposed a policy
of reducing immigration. In 1991 the three major parties (Conservative,
Labour and the Liberal Democrats) received more than 95% of the vote,
while in recent elections their share has been less than 70%.
As to migration trends, during the entire 1970s and 1980s migration
flows were relatively low. In 1981, the net total of migration was negative.
More than 100,000 British people left the UK that year, while only 24,000
immigrants arrived. The percentage of immigrants in England and Wales
(the parts of the UK considered in the analysis) increased from 5% to 6%
during those decades.
Multicultural policies proposed by the Labour party in the early 1990s
are usually considered to have helped the party to affirm itself at the na-
tional level. The loose immigration policies adopted during the Blair years
produced a growing consensus in favour of the Labour party. These reforms
produced a huge increase in immigration flows after 1997. The percentage
of immigrants in the total population increased from just over 6% to about
13%. From the year 2004 onwards, more than 200,000 immigrants settled
in the UK per year. The existence of a pro-immigration political climate in
the early 1990s is also confirmed by the UK’s signature of the Amsterdam
Treaty in 1997 and its position in favour of the enlargement of the European
Union to Central and Eastern European countries.
An example of this change in the role immigration plays in political de-
bate is a straight comparison between the slogans used by Prime Ministers
of the UK in the mid-1990s and today. Blair said that "a simple way to take
measure of a country is to look at how many want in and how many want
out", whereas now May argues that "the aim is to create here in Britain a
really hostile environment for illegal migration." This issue is not the result
of a difference between the Conservative and Labour parties. John Major,
the Conservative Prime Minister who preceded Tony Blair (1990-1997), also
expressed opinions in favour of immigration during his time in office: "There
was a different social value placed on immigration [. . . ] I saw immigration
at very close quarters in the 1950s. They shared my house. They were my
neighbours. I played with them as boys. I did not see people who had come
here just to benefit from our social system. I saw people with guts and the
drive to travel halfway across the world in many cases to better themselves
and their families. And I think that is a very conservative instinct." Further-
more, during the Brexit referendum Major supported Remain and accused
Leave supporters from his own party of using arguments more akin to those
of Ukip, rather than traditional Conservative arguments.
We can therefore conclude that the role of immigration in political debate
has changed in line with major changes in electoral results from the nineties
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onwards, and with changes in the size of migration flows. These elements
provide support to the hypothesis that the sorting of immigrants in 1981
and 1991 was not correlated to actual political preferences. This justifies the
choices of 1981 and 1991 as base years for the instrument.
The figures for immigrant stocks in Local Authority Units in 1981 and in
1991 are taken from the corresponding censuses. We eliminated Harrogate
from the units observed because it is missing from both censuses. These
censuses divide immigrants into seven subgroups (Old Commonwealth, New
Commonwealth, Pakistani, Irish, European Community, other Europeans
and rest of the world).
This instrument is used in different ways to correct for the endogenous
nature of equations (1.1)-(1.4). Firstly, in order to compare with previous
studies, we regress equation (1.1) by using the 1981 yearly base and instru-
menting the stock of immigrants. Secondly, we run the same IV estimation
on equation (1.2), but without instrumenting the flow of immigrants. This
specification derives from the assumption that the endogenous components
are time invariant, and thus the rate of growth is exogenous to the model.
Thirdly, to avoid our assumptions being too restrictive, we instrument the
stock of immigrants both at time t (1991) and at time t − 1 (1981). Since
equation (1.4) takes the form of a Finite Distributed Lag equation, although
with only one lag, to overcome the estimation problems typical of this func-
tional form we also run a three-stage regression in order to avoid possible
autocorrelation problems.
To overcome the limitations posed by the cross-sectional nature of the
Brexit case, in the robustness section we applied the same procedure to a
three-waves panel data on Ukip. Additionally, to overcome the limitations
of aggregated data we run an ordered probit estimation on individual data.
These data are taken from the British Election Study and reflect personal
attitudes to immigration and the vote for Ukip and the Brexit Referendum.
1.4.3 Results
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the results of the OLS and IV estimations. The
first column of both tables corresponds to the standard equation (1.1). The
stock of immigrants is not significant in the OLS estimations, but it becomes
significant in all specifications of the IV model. However, contrary to many
previous studies (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone et al., 2016; Dustmann
et al., 2016; Steinmayr, 2016; Halla et al., 2017), we do not find that the
stock of immigrants has a negative effect on the vote for "Remain": the
coefficient is positive in both cases.
Recent immigration flows always have a significant and negative effect,
whichever model specification and identification strategy we choose. This
last result provides evidence in favour of our hypothesis of a short-run effect:
the coefficient of recent flows is negative and lower than the coefficient of the
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Table 1.2: OLS regressions
Remain Remain Remain
Stock of immigrants 0.0720 -0.413* 0.170
(0.108) (0.205) (0.130)
Stock of immigrants 2012 0.583***
(0.116)
Immigration flows 2012/2015 -0.583**
(0.116)
Unemployment No No No
Income Yes Yes Yes
Cosmopolitan areas Yes Yes Yes
Higher education No No No
Over 65 No No No
Net internal migration flows No No No
Vote at the 1975 referendum No No No
Constant 12.65 13.04 13.04
(9.515) (9.530) (9.530)
Observations 345 345 345
R2 0.699 0.714 0.714
Notes: Errors clustered at regional level in parentheses. Regional dummies are
included (but not reported). We excluded 3 observations (Isle of Wright, Isles of
Scilly, City of London), because of missing data. Cosmopolitan areas include
London and Business and Education centres. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
stock (which is actually positive). Also the magnitude of the effect is large:
if immigration grows by 1 p.p., the share of votes for "Remain" decreases by
2 p.p..
It is worth noting that columns 3 and 5 of the OLS estimations produce
the same results, in spite of the fact that they correspond to different formu-
lations of the same model (see eq. 1.3 and 1.4): the coefficient of the flows
in column 5 is equal to the opposite coefficient of the lagged stock in column
3, while the coefficient of the stock in column 3 is equal to the sum of the
two coefficients in column 5.
Table 1.4 shows the results of the OLS estimations of the Finite Dis-
tributed Lag model in equation (1.7). Referring to the original formulation
in equation (1.5), we consider five variables, each with a three-year lag. Al-
though we do not have sufficient instruments to run an IV estimation, this
formulation allows for a less restrictive short-run assumption, since we do not
implicitly assume that the short-run effect lasts exactly three years and then
suddenly disappears. In this case, the results also support our hypothesis:
the coefficients of immigration flows increase on the lag. Indeed, considering
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Table 1.3: IV regressions
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Remain Remain Remain
Stock of immigrants 0.497*** -2.751*** 0.488***
(0.136) (0.606) (0.156)
Stock of immigrants 2012 3.251***
(0.734)
Growth rate of immigration 2012/2015 -2.018***
(0.577)
Unemployment No No No
Income Yes Yes Yes
Cosmopolitan areas Yes Yes Yes
Higher education No No No
Over 65 No No No
Net internal migration flows No No No
Vote at the 1975 referendum No No No
Constant 8.340 11.09 16.46
(7.265) (7.268) (7.865)
KP test 16.61 14.82 15.80
Observations 344 344 342
R2 0.666 0.396 0.676
Notes: Errors clustered at regional level in parentheses. Regional dummies are
included (but not reported). We excluded 3 observations (Isle of Wright, Isles of
Scilly, City of London), because of missing data. Cosmopolitan areas include
London and Business and Education centres. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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equation (1.6), the coefficients of the variations are:
γ0 = −0, 412; γ1 = 0, 167; γ2 = 0, 361; γ3 = 0, 457; γ4 = 0, 515
and then they turn form positive to negative when l = 0.551, i.e. after
approximately five and a half years.
In all the specifications, the control variables "income" and "urban" are
always significant and positive: wealthier and/or more cosmopolitan areas
returned a higher percentage of votes for "Remain". Unemployment is not
significant. Contrary to what has emerged from descriptive analysis on the
impact of age,9 once other effects are controlled for (especially income), age
structure is not a significant feature. Controlling for natives’ internal migra-
tion and the 1975 Referendum also finds them to be not significant.
1.4.4 Robustness
We carried out two robustness checks. As ours is a cross-sectional analysis,
robustness checks were needed to provide some evidence that this dynamic
process does not result from the effects of unobserved variables on our data.
Firstly, we checked whether our results also held in other elections, namely
with regard to votes for Ukip in the European elections. In particular, we
exploited the panel nature of the data on Ukip to provide a fixed effect esti-
mation, in line with Barone et al. (2016). Our second control used individual-
level data from the British Elections Study to check whether this process was
at work by looking directly at personal attitudes towards immigration and
declarations of vote for Ukip and in the 2016 EU Referendum.
Ukip votes
Immigration must have been a relevant factor in people’s support for Ukip
at previous European Parliament elections, just as it was in the Brexit vote.
This is true for two reasons: 1) in the 2016 Referendum, “Leave” received
52% of the vote; in 2014 Ukip received 26,8% of votes cast, in 2009 16%, and
in 2004 16.1%.It thus follows that what is true for the Brexit vote should
hold even more true when it comes to support for Ukip; 2) Ukip is a party
with a clear anti-immigration stance. The increase in their share of the vote
over time can be explained by the way in which they used the immigration
issue to call the UK’s continued membership of the European Union into
question. If our control does not confirm our previous results, then our idea
of considering "Leave" votes as anti-immigration should be dismissed.
9see for example http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-why-did-old-
people-vote-leave-young-voters-remain-eu-referendum-a7103996.html
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Table 1.4: Distributed lag model
Remain
Long-run effect 0.747∗∗∗
(0.137)
Short-run effect -1.159∗∗∗
(0.232)
Unemployment No
Income Yes
Cosmopolitan areas Yes
Higher Education No
Over 65 No
Net internal migration flows No
Vote at the 1975 referendum No
Constant 13.07
(9.550)
Observations 345
R2 0.713
Errors clustered at regional level in parentheses.
Regional dummies are included (but not reported).
We excluded 3 observations (Isle of Wright,
Isles of Scilly, City of London), because of missing data.
Cosmopolitan areas include London and Business and Education centres.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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We replicated our main model and provided an additional fixed effect
panel model and then an IV panel fixed effect model. Contrary to our previ-
ous analysis on Brexit, this data permits us to use an econometric strategy
that controls for unobserved fixed effects. Of course, we have to look at the
sign of the coefficients in the opposite way, as more votes for Ukip here corre-
spond to a positive coefficient. We should thus find more evidence in support
of our hypothesis, with recent immigrant flows having a more positive effect
than the immigrant stock.
Table 1.5: Panel Estimations on Ukip
OLS OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-3SLS
Ukip Ukip Ukip Ukip Ukip
Stock of immigrants -0.152∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗ -4.266∗∗∗ -1.605
(0.0317) (0.0344) (0.119) (0.926) (2.052)
Immigration flows 0.246∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 2.048∗∗∗
(0.0705) (0.0801) (0.459)
Lagged stock of immigrants -3.758∗∗∗
(1.159)
Unemployment 0.663 0.710 2.143∗ 2.355∗∗ 2.040∗∗
(0.732) (0.763) (1.159) (0.993) (0.999)
High Education 3.199 2.998
(2.026) (2.023)
Income 0.00456∗∗ 0.00562∗∗
(0.00181) (0.00185)
Over 65 0.294∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗
(0.0753) (0.0533)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unit fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.997∗∗ 5.316∗∗ 19.48∗∗∗ 47.21∗∗∗ 33.68∗∗∗
(2.079) (1.829) (0.855) (7.222) (8.419)
Observations 1031 1031 1031 1028 1028
R2 0.641 0.647 0.803 0.017
Errors clustered at regional level in parentheses.
We excluded 3 observations (Isle of Wright, Isles of Scilly, City of London), because of missing data.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Our robustness checks conclusively support our previous results. The flow
of immigrants has a positive effect on votes for Ukip, while the immigrant
stock has a negative effect. Fixed effects strengthen the coefficients, which
are further increased in magnitude by the use of an instrumental variable
strategy. This is in line with Barone et al. (2016). The stock has a bias in
the opposite direction, but the bias on flows is consistent with the theoretical
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underpinnings of their results.
Given that our cross-sectional analysis on Brexit may have raised con-
cerns regarding the dependence of our results on unobserved fixed effects, it
is reassuring to see these results confirm their validity. It should be noted
that this provides evidence that this dynamic process is not time-dependent,
as here we also consider the 2009 and 2004 elections, which are quite far
removed from 2015 in terms of time. In terms of results, they tell the same
story as our analysis of the Brexit vote.
Data at the individual level
In spite of our use of an instrumental variable approach, it is still be possible
that our results are produced by some spurious correlation with political
preferences at a regional level. There may be additional underlying regional
factors that explain both immigration flows and political preferences, which
were not taken care of by our instrumental variable approach. Therefore, it
is useful to consider for robustness some finer data at the individual level
that directly tests personal attitudes to immigration and people’s reported
voting intentions with regard to Ukip and Brexit.
We merge the 7th wave of the British Election Study, conducted by
YouGov in 2015, with ONS statistics on the distribution of immigrants and
exclude Scotland, Northern Ireland and all immigrants from the dataset.
The flows we consider is the difference in the stock of immigrants between
2011 and 2014. The model is an ordered probit model on the questions "Do
immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live", "If there were
a UK General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?", and "If
there were a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union,
how do you think you would vote?", using the same variables of interest and
controls as our baseline model.
This check gives relevant support to our main results, because it tests
the same short-run effect with variables at the individual level. We do not
find a significant effect produced by the stock of immigrants (all p-values
are above 5%), which is consistent with the weak significance it had in our
previous analysis and with contact theories on intergroup relations. The ef-
fect of migrant inflows in recent times is significant and negative. Therefore,
even when controlling for variables such as unemployment, income and de-
mographics at the individual level, the effect of immigration is still significant
and temporary.
1.5 Conclusions
Arguments relating to immigration, tinged with nationalist tones, play a key
role in current political debate, particularly since the onset of the economic
crisis. Nigel Farage, David Cameron, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini and
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Table 1.6: OLS on Individual Data
Immigration Ukip Remain
good or bad
Stock of immigrants 0.00498∗ 0.000840 0.00663∗
(0.00292) (0.00378) (0.00365)
Immigration flows -0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗ -0.0160∗∗
(0.00489) (0.00569) (0.00668)
Unemployment No No Yes
Income No No No
Cosmopolitan areas No No No
Higher Education Yes Yes Yes
Over 65 Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes No No
N 6983 6983 6983
Errors clustered at LAU level in parentheses.
We exclude all migrants from the dataset.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
26
others have succeeded, not without the help of the media, in framing the
question of Europe as a question of immigration. At the same time, over the
last twenty years there has been an unprecedented rise in immigration flows
right across Europe. Both issues determine the need to further investigate
the political impact of migration. In particular, we wanted to analyse the
dynamic aspects of the impact of migrant inflows on votes, testing for a neg-
ative short-run effect. In considering this issue, we have taken into account
the potential role of prejudices - stereotypes born out of a lack of informa-
tion and destined to fade over time, as people become more familiar with the
new immigrant population. We have also mentioned how the integration of
immigrants may take time because welfare systems and job markets are slow
to adjust to the increased population. Given these processes, it is relevant
to assess whether the effect of immigration on voting depends merely on the
stock of immigrants per se, or whether it is influenced by the time-path of
the immigration process.
Our results show that the time-path is indeed the key. The effect of
recent immigration flows is more negative than the effect of the stock of
immigrants and of the lagged flows, thereby confirming a short-run effect.
In general, while there are correlations between stocks and flows, estimates
based on the stock alone may be biased. Trying to understand the effects of
immigration on the popular vote by simply analysing the stock of immigrants
per se can be deceptive. In the case of Brexit, where stock and flows are only
weakly correlated, the effects on the electorate of the stock of immigrants
per se would have returned a positive effect on votes, although one that was
barely significant. Taking immigrant flows into account, however, enables
us to find evidence that, in line with reports by research companies and
evidence from the BES, immigration was indeed a key factor in the result
of the Brexit referendum. Excluding income and the case of cosmopolitan
areas, immigration seems to have been the referendum’s main determining
factor.
This paper also contributes to the emerging body of literature on the
political outcomes of immigration by proposing an explanation as to why
there are differences between the impact of immigration in large cities and
in small towns. In fact, migration to large cities goes back further than
migration to small towns, with the result that the short-run effect that we
have found may have long ago been overcome. Therefore, we suggest that by
considering the time process of immigration it is possible to investigate this
issue without having to distinguish between areas by density of population.
In conclusion, we wish to point out that our analysis is necessarily only
a starting point. We interpreted the evidence on Brexit as supportive of our
hypothesis, but plenty of work is still required to analyse the factors that
determine immigration’s effect on the vote. The elements underpinning the
short-run and long-run effects and the relationship between the two are still
to be investigated. For example, which aspect is more relevant: prejudice
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or material concerns? As for the former, there may be attitudes rooted
in culture that may derive from historical events, such as decolonisation or
racism. However, it could also be that failures in integration policies are
responsible for these effects. Moreover, are we fully aware of the role played
by the media and by political narratives? Given the current relevance of
"post-factual" phenomena, there is a need to investigate this issue. It could
be that there is no correlation between watching television and personal
attitudes towards migration; alternatively, it could be that the media and
political narratives influence people’s perceptions or that, more subtly, they
validate previously-held beliefs, facilitating their propagation.
In the 1930s, alternative facts and propaganda in Europe were already
fuelling prejudices against ethnic or religious minorities. Back then, the same
arguments over minorities were being propagated as over immigrants now.
There would appear to be nothing new under the sun! However, given that
the current popularity of anti-immigration agendas corresponds to increased
immigration flows in recent years, there is need to better understand this
relation. Our contribution to the subject is the conclusion that the effect of
immigration on voting patterns depends on the specific time-path of immi-
gration.
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Chapter 2
Need for Flexibility or
Subsidies? Reviewing the
Impact of Immigration on the
Domestic Labour Market
The migration issue is drawing increasing attention from all the social sci-
ences. As economists we would like to contribute to the debate by analysing
and explaining the reaction of the markets to this shock. Here we review the
most important papers that have tried to answer to the question "Do im-
migrants worsen the labour market conditions of natives?". They concerne
three broad arguments: the competition between native and immigrant work-
ers, the location decision of natives, and the reaction of firms. Together they
contribute to draw a complete framework within which we can understand
the reaction of the domestic labour market to a migration inflow. In partic-
ular, the tentative conclusion of a non-negative effect of foreign workers on
native average wage in the context of a flexible labour market is based on
the assumption of a perfect elastic capital supply. We conclude that this is
a crucial hypothesis which plausibility needs to be further analysed.
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2.1 Introduction
In 2015 there were about 21 millions refugees all over the world,1 meaning
that at least 21 millions forced migrants lived in a country different of that of
birth. These figures are the highest from the Second World War and the Eu-
ropean "refugee crisis" is drawing large attention from all the social sciences.
Economics is giving new insight to the current situation, as witnessed by the
increasing literature on the effect of refugees and immigrants on welfare and
on political preferences.(e.g. Dustmann et al., 2016; Barone et al., 2016).
Furthermore, economics can give its contribution by analyzing and explain-
ing the reaction of the markets to this shock. Indeed, the economic literature
has been looking at the effects of immigration on the receiving economy from
long time, motivated by the great relevance that the phenomenon has always
had for the American society. Among others, many studies have concerned
the impacts of immigration on economic growth, on international trade and
on domestic labour market. The main concern of labour economists has been
the effects of immigrant workers on the labour market outcomes of natives,
especially on wages. The answer to the question “Do immigrants worsen the
labour market conditions of natives?” is not unique neither in theory nor in
the data.
In this article, we review some of the seminal papers that in various way
have tried to answer to the previous question. As it will be more clear in
what follows, these contributions can be split into three streams – the com-
petition between natives and immigrants, the location decisions of natives,
and the reaction of firms. Each of them deserves to be analysed separately.
Nonetheless, they are mutually related and together they depict a general
framework within which we can understand the reaction of the domestic
economy to a migration flow.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the early economic
studies on the effect of immigration on native workers, which have started the
ongoing debate. Section 2.3 synthesizes researches that have focused on the
degree of competition between immigrants and natives in the labour market.
Section 2.4 and section 2.5 present respectively the empirical studies on the
natives location decisions and on the firms reaction following a migration
shock. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Early studies on the impact of immigration
At the very beginning of the economic analysis of immigration, the issue
was studied from a theoretical point of view. Johnson (1980) trivially dis-
tinguished between the short-run and the long-run effect. The short run
was defined as the time period in which wages are fixed and the actual out-
1http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html
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put could be different from the potential one. In this case, an increase in
the supply of low-skilled workers, due to an immigration shock, simply re-
sults in a higher unemployment rate. Instead, to evaluate the effects of the
same shock in the long run the author made three alternative assumptions.
First, he supposed that wages are free to adjust so that the labour market
clears. This scenario is called the frictional unemployment model. Second,
he hypothesized that real wages are fixed, due to labour market institutions
or to the presence of asymmetric information, so the final result does not
differ from the one in the short-run. This is the structural unemployment
model. Finally, he assumed that the labour supply is not inelastic, but up-
ward sloped, so immigrants that enter the labour market lead some natives
to exit. This case is defined the induced unemployment model. On the basis
of previous studies of labour economics, the author concluded that the first
one is the “[...]most accurate analytical description of most labour markets
in the United States”.2 This expectation came from the perfect competition
hypothesis from both the supply side and the demand side of the labour
market. Most of the early researches shared this framework and so they ex-
pected to measure a contraction of native real wages in order to accomodate
for the increased labour supply.
The first attempt to empirically evaluate the variation in native wages
due to a change in the share of immigrants was by Grossman (1982). Follow-
ing the standard theory, he estimated the elasticity of substitution between
two labour inputs distinguished by immigration status. The empirical strat-
egy consisted of exploiting the different concentration of immigrants across
American cities to measure the reaction of native wage to a change in the
foreign labour supply. Grossman’s estimates suggested that workers disag-
gregated by immigration status are substitutes in production – with natives
more substitutable with second generation immigrants than with the newly
arrived. This result reflected the standard assimilation process to the host
society described by Chiswick (1978). However, the effect of an increase in
immigrant labour supply on native wages resulted only negligible.
Borjas (1987) arrived to the same conclusion. The author tried to better
understand the relationship in production between immigrants and natives
and he repeated the estimates implemented by Grossman (1982), but he
further disaggregated workers by ethnicity. So, instead of having three com-
peting groups (native, first- and second-generation), the author had to esti-
mate the elasticities of substitution between eight groups of workers (white-,
black-, hispanic- and asian-natives and white-, black-, hispanic- and asian-
immigrants). As in Grossman, Borjas (1987) did not find any sizable impacts
of immigrant workers on native wages. Nonetheless, immigrants have a no-
table effect on the determination of their own wage levels, implying that
foreign workers compete more with themselves than with natives.
2See Johnson (1980) pag. 335
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The inconsistency between the theoretical prediction of a reduction in
native wages to accomodate for the increased labour supply and the empirical
findings of a negligible effect of immigration on the prices of native labour
inputs was addressed for the first time by David Card in two papers which
have become seminal in the literature on labour migration – Card (1990)
and Altonji and Card (1991). In the first one, the author gave the insight
according to which immigrants do not choose exogenously where to locate,
but they move to cities where the growth in labour demand can accommodate
for their supply. Furthermore, natives can respond to the migration inflow
by emigrating to cities with low immigrant density. Both arguments weaken
the validity of the analyses that use the correlation across cities between
native wages and immigrant density in order to evaluate the impact of foreign
workers on the labour outcomes of natives.
As a solution the author suggested to exploit a natural experiment, such
that of the Mariel Boatlift,3 which better corresponded to an exogenous
change in labour supply to a particular labour market. However, the study
based on the data from the Miami experience showed again only a weak
correlation between the share of immigrants and the reduction in native
wages. This result was confirmed by the second paper (Altonji and Card,
1991) which addressed the problem of the endogenous migration choice with
an instrumental variable approach. A common feature of migration flows,
indeed, is that immigrants tend to live where previous immigrants from
the same country settled (Bartel, 1989). So, in order to capture only the
exogenous variation in the share of foreign workers, Altonji and Card (1991)
instrumented the current immigration with the fraction of foreign population
of the same ethnicity in the previous time period. The coefficient obtained
with the IV estimator was higher than the one estimated by OLS – but still
very small.
Another important contribution of the aforementioned paper was the
analysis of the industry-specific labour markets within cities. In general,
what emerged from the study was that the competition between immigrants
and natives is diminished by the fact that less-skilled natives and immigrants
are not employed in the same industries. This is a result of a native displace-
ment from immigrant-intensive industries, which is clear from the comparison
of the industry distribution of less-skilled natives in cities with relatively high
and relatively low immigrant densities. Furthermore, the authors found that
the falling employment trend in these industries at the national level slowed
down in cities with high immigrant density, suggesting that some low-wage
industries survived thanks to the availability of immigrant labour.
From the early contributions reviewed we can highlight three key adjust-
3In April 20, 1980 Fidel Castro declared that Cubans wishing to emigrate were free to
leave from the port of Mariel. Nevertheless the choice of the destination country remained
up to the individuals. The result of this policy change was that half of the emigrants settle
in Miami and the labour force of the city increases by 7%.
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ment processes of the local economies to immigration – changes in factor
prices, natives relocation across industries and across local labour markets,
change in labour demand. These adjustment channels have been examined
in depth in the economic literature on labour migration and we are going to
examine them separately.
2.3 The substitutability in production between im-
migrants and natives
There are two important sources of bias in the regional analyses of the im-
pact of immigration on the labour market outcomes of natives – the positive
growth in wages that attracts immigrants and the native decision to move
away from high immigrant density areas. To overcome these problems, Bor-
jas (2003) suggested a sharp solution. Since emigration rate in the U.S. is
quite low, the national labour market can be considered closed for natives.
Furthermore, the skill-composition of immigrants differs from that of natives
and this variation can be considered more exogenous than the geographic one.
The intuition was to divide workers by educational attainment and by years
of job experience and to measure the effect of an increase in the immigrant
share on the marginal productivity of natives within a particular skill-group.
This approach is based on the assumption that workers who have the same
schooling but differ in the experience level are imperfect substitutes in pro-
duction and this is a standard assumption in the studies of the structure of
wages outside the migration context (e.g. Card and Lemieux, 2001).
Since the approach proposed by Borjas (2003) has been followed by a lot
of subsequent papers studying the impact of immigration on native wages,
it is useful to recall it here. Suppose that the aggregate production function
at the national level can be represented by a CES technology like
Qt = [λKtK
ν
t + λLtL
ν
t ]
1
ν (2.1)
where Qt is the output at time t, Kt is the capital and Lt denotes the aggre-
gate labour input. The elasticity of substitution between inputs is regulated
by ν = (1 − 1σKL ), with σKL ∈ (0,+∞) being the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour. λKt and λLt are time-variant technology pa-
rameters. Lt incorporates the contributions at time t of workers who differ
in education and experience. So let
Lt = [
∑
i
θitL
ρ
it]
1
ρ (2.2)
where Lit gives the number of workers with education i which in turn is given
by
[Lit = [
∑
j
αijtL
η
ijt]
1
η (2.3)
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where Lijt is the number of workers in education group i and experience
group j.
In this model the parameters of interest are ρ = 1− 1σE and η = 1− 1σX ,
with σE and σX being the elasticities of substitution between workers with
respectively different education and different experience. If their value is
smaller or greater than zero (or equivalently σ < 1 or σ > 1), the vari-
ous groups of workers are imperfect complements or imperfect substitutes
in production. Furthermore, if the parameters ρ and η approach one (or
equivalently σ →∞) the various labour inputs are perfectly substitutes. In
other words, the values of ρ and η regulate the sign and the magnitude of
the supply effects on wages.
From the first order conditions of the theoretical model we can derive
the following empirical strategy. First, assuming that the cross-elasticities
are constant between experience groups, σX can be estimated by
logωijt = δ − ( 1
σX
)logLijt + εijt
where the vector δ of fixed effects absorbs any region-specific, skill-specific,
and time-specific factors that affect the evolution of the native workforce
in a particular skill-group. Then, assuming that the cross-elasticities are
constant between education groups, σE can be estimated by
logωit = δ − ( 1
σE
)logLit + eit
Merging the data from various waves of the Public Use Microdata Sam-
ples (PUMS) and the Current Population Surveys (CPS), the estimated val-
ues of the regression coefficients by Borjas (2003) were respectively equal to
−0.288 (s.e. 0.115) and −0.741 (s.e. 0.646). In turns, these measures imply
that σX is around 3.5 and σE is about 1.3. Therefore, the evidences indi-
cate that workers with different level of experience are imperfect substitutes.
Furthermore, there is a greater degree of substitution among workers with
the same education but different experience than between workers who differ
by the education level. Borjas (2003) then used the estimated wage elastic-
ities to simulate the impact of the immigrants influx to U.S. between 1980
and 2000. On average, the effect of immigration on the native wages has
been negative and equal to -0.032, meaning that an increase of 10% in the
immigrant share has produced a reduction in wages by about 3%. The effect
has been greater for the highest and the lowest educated group of workers
because immigrants to U.S. clustered in these two categories.
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) built their analysis on the same model pre-
sented here. They added two important elements which significantly modify
several results of the related study. First of all they stressed the importance
of using a general equilibrium framework to evaluate the effects of immigra-
tion on wages of workers who differ by education, experience and nationality.
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In particular, they suggested to take into account the interaction between
all type of workers as well as between labour and capital. On the contrary,
in the paper by Borjas (2003) capital was ignored and considered fixed. The
complementarity between labour and capital implies that, if investments do
not adjust to the increase in labour supply, the labour share of income de-
creases in favour of capital owners. Second, they removed the assumption
that foreign- and U.S.- born workers are perfect substitutes within the same
education-experience group and they tested it empirically. So, to the the-
oretical model presented above, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) added another
level of labour aggregation and Lijt is given by
Lijt = [ϕHijtH
µ
ijt + ϕFijtF
µ
ijt]
1
µ (2.4)
where Hijt and Fijt denote respectively the number of native and foreign
workers with education i, experience j at time t. The elasticity of substitu-
tion between natives and immigrants is ruled by µ = 1− 1σN . While Borjas
(2003) assumeded σN → ∞, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) tested in the data
whether the regression coefficient of the following model is effectively equal
to zero:
log(
ωHijt
ωFijt
) = δ − ( 1
σN
)log(
Hijt
Fijt
) + uijt
The various estimates of the regression coefficient obtained by Ottaviano
and Peri (2006) were significantly different from zero. They indicate that σN
assumes a determined value and strongly support the idea of imperfect sub-
stitutability between U.S.- and foreign-born workers. Furthermore, the esti-
mates suggest a value of σN between 5 and 10, hence reasonably greater than
the substitutability between educational groups, and only slightly higher
than the substitutability between experience groups. Then they used the
estimated value of σN to simulate the effect of the migration influx to the
U.S. from 1990 to 2004 on wages and some of them are presented in Table 1
together with the results for σN =∞.
The preferred estimates by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) are those for
σN = 6.6 and a perfectly elastic supplied capital (bottom right panel of Ta-
ble 1), while the results by Borjas (2003) are in line with those for σN =∞
and a fixed capital (top left panel of Table 1). The short-run effect implies
a partial redistribution of the national income in favor of capital owners and
a greater negative impact on all type of workers. The adjustment of the
investments in the long-run attenuates the negative effect of immigration on
wages in general and in the case of perfect substitutability between immi-
grants and natives it is almost null. Indeed, the hypothesis of a constant
return-to-scale production function implies that the migration shock can-
not be pareto-improving, unless it changes the technology parameters. In
the current framework, immigration has simply a redistributive effect which
increases the wage dispersion in all cases. Furthermore, the effect of immi-
gration can be considered positive on average if we take into account only
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Table 2.1: Calculated Percentage Change in Real Wages due to Immigrantion
Inflows: 1990-2004
Short-run Effects (Fixed K)
σN =∞ σN = 6.6
High school dropout -7.9 High school dropout -4.8
High school -2.6 High school -1.2
College dropout -1.2 College dropout -0.2
College -5.2 College -2.9
Average -3.5 Average -1.9
Immigrants -4.7 Immigrants -23.4
Long-run Effects ( K˙K = 0)
σN =∞ σN = 6.6
High school dropout -4.2 High school dropout -1.1
High school 1.0 High school 2.4
College dropout 2.4 College dropout 3.4
College -1.5 College 0.7
Average 0.1 Average 1.8
Immigrants -0.9 Immigrants -19.8
native wages and we neglet immigrants economic outcomes. However, this
is a mistake not only from a moral perspective, but also because of all the
economic costs emerging from social and economic exclusion.
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) ignored another important aspect of the model.
They developed their analysis in the context of a neo-classical growth model4
where, thank to the constant returns to scale, we can consider only per-capita
variables and conclude that the dynamics of the system follows the popu-
lation rate of growth. In other words, the immigration shock is absorbed
like a standard increase in the number of people. Nevertheless, from ev-
ery simulation clearly emerges a redistribution from the most disadvantage
segment of the income distribution, where immigrants are located, in favor
of more advantage native groups. The propensity to consume and to save
are different along the income distribution and thus some demand deficits
or saving surplus, which are not part of the representative agent model, can
arise and they have to be explicitly considered in order for the simulations
to be plausible.
Turning back to the substitutability between immigrants and natives
within skill-groups, we have to cite another important paper that again tried
to empirically measure it, that of Borjas et al. (2008). Actually, the authors
4They specifically cited Solow (1956) and Ramsey (1928).
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argued that the estimates presented by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) were seri-
ously biased. They demonstrated that including high-school enrolled workers
into the category of high-school dropout, like Ottaviano and Peri (2006) did,
led to a misspecification problem. Indeed, high-school enrolled workers show
less labour-market attachment then high-school dropouts and they exit the
market more easily when they face a wage decrease. In other words, they
show a greater supply elasticity which biases the estimation of the regression
coefficient and leads to the conclusion of imperfect substitutability between
immigrants and natives. All the adjusted estimates presented by Borjas
et al. (2008) could not reject the null hypothesis and so the assumption of
σN =∞.
The reply of Ottaviano and Peri (2008) to these arguments was that
of using a simpler classification of educational categories – high- and low-
educated workers. The first includes workers with some college or higher
education and the second all other workers. This simplification diluted the
adverse impact that immigrants have on the lowest and on the highest ed-
ucated workers (high-school dropout and college graduates) and it arrived
again to the conclusion of imperfect substitutability in production.
Besides the empirical debate on the measure of the elasticity of substitu-
tion, we need a theory that justifies the imperfect substitutability between
immigrants and natives. This arrived with the contribution of Peri and
Sparber (2008). In their analysis the authors supposed that the production
function combine high-skilled and low-skilled labour. The first requires only
communication tasks while the second is a mix of communication and man-
ual tasks. They focused on low-skilled labour which is supplied by native and
immigrant workers who differ by their efficiency in the two tasks. By maxi-
mizing their returns to labour, natives specialize in jobs which require more
language skills while immigrants in jobs with more manual tasks. This job
differentiation reduces the competition between the two groups of workers in
the labour market and therefore it alleviates the negative impact that immi-
gration can have on native wages. To demonstrate the theoretical prediction
the authors regressed the average native supply of manual and communi-
cation tasks on the immigrants share across time and states. The results
obtained led the authors to conclude that immigration does not bring any
negative effects on natives who can relocate in the labour market. Therefore,
in order to neutralize the predicted adverse impact of immigration on native
wages labour market has to be flexible, meaning in particular low hiring and
firing costs.
Nevertheless, imperfect substitutability have been questioned again by
Dustmann et al. (2013) with their study on immigration in UK. The authors
started from the observation that immigrants’ skills substantially downgrade
when they arrive in the destination country. Indeed, immigrants are on aver-
age better educated then natives but their observed location is at the lower
end of the distribution of wages. Their intuition was to identify skill types
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with the position in the wage distribution rather than with the educational
attainment, and to measure the effect of immigration on the various per-
centile of the wage distribution. The estimated effects were in line with the
observed location on immigrants – while immigration depresses wages be-
low the 20th percentile, it contributes to wage growth above the 40th. They
also found a positive effect on average wage. Immigrants are paid less than
their marginal productivity and this give rise to a native surplus, shared by
workers and capital owners.
This last study has the advantage to be free from the standard Walrasian
hypothesis, according to which workers are divided by homogenous groups
and where marginal conditions determine the equilibrium. More realisti-
cally, we can imagine that immigrants and natives do not compete in the
same labour market not only because of different productivity levels, but
also because of different protections, different job opportunities, personal
networks, and discrimination.
2.4 The location decisions of natives in response to
immigration
After the 1965 Immigration Act which changed the face of U.S. immigration,
in the political and social debates started to emerge the so called balkaniza-
tion hypotesis. The term balkanization was originally used to describe the
process of fragmentation or division of a region into a smaller sub-regions
that are often hostile or uncooperative with one another. This reflected the
concern that the characteristics of immigrants to locally cluster deterred na-
tives to reside in the same area. In the economic literature, the importance
of this issue was not limited to understand the direct question of native loca-
tion decision and employment opportunities. It was also informative about
the validity of performing cross-regional analyses of the wage effects of immi-
gration. We discuss here two seminal contributions to the topic - Card and
DiNardo (2000), which has been recalled in Card (2005) and Card (2007),
and Borjas (2006).
In the first one the authors analyse the causal relationship between immi-
grant inflows and native outflows. In particular, what they want to ascertain
is if the arrival of one immigrant of a given skill type to a local labour mar-
ket leads one native of the same skill type to leave. The relative share of a
particular skill group is determinant for the real wage of that group, and the
authors want to verify if the relocation of natives leave that share unchanged.
Given the following decomposition,
∆log (
Pij
Pj
) = (
∆Mij
Pij
− ∆Mj
Pj
) + (
∆Nij
Pij
− ∆Nj
Pj
) (2.5)
where Pij is the number of workers of skill type i in region j, Mij and Nij
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are respectively the number of foreign- and native-born workers of skill type
i in region j, Card and DiNardo (2000) posit a simple behavioral equation
that can be empirically tested:
∆Nij
Pij
− ∆Nj
Pj
= a+ b (
∆Mij
Pij
− ∆Mj
Pj
) + υij
Nij andMij keep the same meaning, υij is the idiosyncratic error term and b
regulate the causal relationship. If native-born location decisions fully offset
immigrant inflows, the coefficient b is equal to −1. At the opposite extreme,
a value of b equal to 0 implies that the relative share of native-born workers
of a particular skill-type does not change in response to the increase in the
foreign labour force. The estimates based on the 1970, 1980 and 1990 decen-
nial Censuses show no evidences that native out-migration rises in response
to immigrants arrive. Perhaps surprisingly, the estimated value of b is sig-
nificantly positive, meaning that native workers are attracted by the same
regions where immigrants decide to locate. Therefore, the authors conclude
that "[...]the local labour market impacts of unskilled immigration are miti-
gated by other avenues of adjustment, such us endogenous shifts in industry
structure, rather than by rapid adjustments in the native population".5
Here we have to underline two facts. The first is that the data available to
Card and DiNardo (2000) may not be sufficiently detailed to make emerge the
real dynamic of native relocation. As demonstrated by Monras (2015), the
share of low-skilled workers decreases in high- and low-immigration states.
This reflects the well-known secular increase in education levels. Neverthe-
less, the native low-skilled population decreases less fast in high-immigration
states. This is why in Card and DiNardo (2000) a positive correlation be-
tween native- and foreign-born low-skilled workers emerges from the geo-
graphic comparison. Endogenous shifts in the labour demand can be the
driving forces, as suggested in the conclusions. Monras (2015) also shows
that in the two years after the migration shock, the share of native low-skilled
workers stay stable or even increases slightly in low-immigration states for
the effect of internal relocation. This dynamic is too fast to be captured
by the decennial dataset of Card and DiNardo (2000). Second, the theoret-
ical framework in Card and DiNardo (2000) does not represent the causal
relationship between migration inflows and native-born location decisions.
Instead, it refers to the so called skating rink model - each new immigrants
knocks a native off the ice. Suppose that native labour force responds to
wage differentials moving across regions even before the arrival of the for-
eign workers. Then, what we have to identify is the effect of immigration
on those movements, and not only on the decisions of leaving a particular
labour market. In other words, the aim of the study should be the counter-
factual distribution of native labour force across regions. Clearly this goal
5see Card and DiNardo (2000) pag. 366
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is very difficult to achieve. Borjas (2006) tries to give a contribution in this
direction. His theoretical framework jointly models the native-born location
decisions and wage determination in local labour markets. Let us see it in
details.
The wage for skill group i in region j at time t is given by:
ωijt = XijtL
η
ijt (2.6)
where Xijt is a demand shifter which we suppose that is both time- and
region-invariat, so Xijt = Xi. This simplification implies that wages for
skill group i differ across regions only because the stock of workers is not
evenly distributed geographically. We suppose that immigration occurs at
time t = 0 and we define the following quantities:
Nij,−1 the number of native workers of skill type i, in region j, in the pre-
immigration period,
∆Nijt the net migration of natives belonging to skill group i between (t−1)
and t experienced by region j,
Mijt the influx of immigrants of skill type i to region j at time t.
The immigration flows continue in the same number every year, soMijt =
Mij . We further suppose that immigrants do not migrate internally within
the United States. We can rewrite the labour demand function given by
Equation (2.6) as follow:
log ωijt = log Xi + η log [Nij,−1 + (t+ 1)Mij + ∆Nij0 + · · ·+ ∆Nijt] (2.7)
which can be approximated by:
log ωijt ≈ log ωij−1 + η [(t+ 1) mij + νij0 + νij1 + · · ·+ νijt] (2.8)
where we have divided every term by Nij,−1 and we put νijt =
∆Nijt
Nij,−1 . This
last term is the net migration rate of natives. We assume that the internal
migration response of native workers occurs with a lag:
νij0 = ε (log ωij,−1 − log ω¯i) (2.9)
where ε is the labour supply elasticity and ω¯i is the theoretical equilibrium
wage observed throughout the national economy once all migration response
have been made. Given N¯i the number of native workers of skill type i that
would live in each region since the theoretical equilibrium wage is attained,
the previous equation can be rewritten as:
νij0 = ηελij (2.10)
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with λij = log (
Nij,−1
N¯i
).
Native net migration continues concurrently with the immigrant influx
and from t = 1 ahead it is shown to be equal to:
νijt = ηε (1 + ηε)
t λij + [1− (1 + ηε)t mi]− [1− (1 + ηε)t mij ] (2.11)
with mi = MiN¯1 , and Mi gives the per-period flow of immigrants in skill group
i.
Unfortunately the available data are not sufficiently detailed to allow Bor-
jas (2006) to estimate the dynamic evolution of the native workforce and the
wage structure as summarized by Equations (2.8) and (2.11). Nonetheless,
the effects of many variables are absorbed by including appropriately defined
vectors of fixed effects in the regressions. The resulting empirical model is
than estimated using three different definitions for the geographic area j:
the Census division, the State, and the metropolitan area. The conclusion
to draw by comparing the three estimates is that the negative impact of
immigrant share variable on native net migration gets numerically stronger
the smaller the geographic boundaries of the labour market. Symmetrically,
the measured wage impact of immigration gets larger as one expand the size
of the market.
Although Borjas (2006) gives important theoretical insights, the empiri-
cal evaluation poses severe limitations. To understand the main shortcoming
of the model we follow Peri and Sparber (2011). They rewrite the regression
estimated by Borjas (2006) as follow:
log Nijt = α+ β(
Mijt
Nijt +Mijt
) + γ Xijt + si + rj + τt
+ (si × rj) + (si × τt) + (rj × τt) + ξijt
It is easy to notice that Nijt appears at both sides of the equation. It
raises the dependent variable while decreasing the explanatory variable. This
would induce a negative correlation independently of any true causal rela-
tionship.
Peri and Sparber (2011) focuses on how specify the explanatory and
dependents variable in the regression model that aim at estimating displace-
ment - how many native workers respond to the arrival of a single immigrant
by leaving their region of residence. The authors simulate a world in which
they know whether or not displacement exists. They assume the data gen-
erating process given by the following model
∆Nijt = α+ β∆Mijt + uijt
and they create several dataset with unique assumed values of β. Negative
values, according to their definition, imply displacement. Positive values im-
ply that immigrants somehow attract natives. The results make the authors
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to conclude that Borjas (2006) specification exhibits a large bias in favor of
displacement. Despite they succeeded in identifying the formal problem in
the estimates by Borjas (2006), they fail in understanding the theoretical
difference of the work. As highlighted before, Borjas (2006) does not refer
simply to the skating rink or displacement model. Also Beine and Coulombe
(2014) show that the reaction of domestic workers in terms of internal mobil-
ity materializes mainly through the decrease in the immigration on natives in
the provinces receiving more immigrants. On the contrary, Peri and Sparber
(2011) seek to verify if natives response to immigration by emigrating out of
the region where immigrants settle, and their test critically depend on the
theoretical assumptions made.
Whether or not the local labour markets adjust to immigration through
relocation is still debated and with it the validity of the area-approach to
the impact of immigration on wages. Anyway, it remains to evaluate another
important channel of adjustment which is often mentioned as a driving force
- the change in labour demand. To conclude as in Borjas (2006), we can
say "[. . . ]Although native migration can explain a good part of the adjust-
ment mechanism, it is likely that flows of good or capital are also important
ingredients in the story".6
2.5 The adjustment of the labour demand to supply
shocks
The negligible effect of immigration on native wages can have one last impor-
tant explanation – the labour demand response. The channels through which
we can observe an increase in the labour demand are two. First, the greater
availability of unskilled workers can induce labour-intensive industries in ex-
panding their production. This is a well known result of the international
trade theory. The Heckscher-Ohlin model concludes that, given technologies
and preferences, the different factor endowments will lead to a specialization
(full or partial) in the production of the good that uses more intensively
the relatively more abundant factor.7 Therefore, after a migration shock we
should observe a change in the output mix in favor of industries that employ
unskilled labour more intensively. Second, due to the substitutability be-
tween unskilled labour and some kind of capital, the increase in the supply
of low-skilled workers can lead to an endogenous technological change that
is capital-saving. In other words, after a migration shock we should observe
a more intensive use of unskilled labour.
The theory behind the second effect is offered by Lewis (2011), which
analyses the effect that skill mix has on technology use, rather than the
more commonly studied reverse relationship. Focusing on manufacturing
6see Borjas (2006) pag. 225
7For a thorough discussion of the HO model see Feenstra (2015).
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production, the final output is a function of automation machinery (KM )
and two types of labour – high skill (H) and low skill (L):
P = A(KθM − Lθ)
α
θH1−α
where θ and α are the parameters that regulate the substitutability and
complementarity between the various inputs, like in a more general CES
production function. For a positive value of θ ≤ 1 machinery and unskilled
labour are substitutes in production. This implies that an increase in the
supply of low skilled labour that reduces its rate of return will make machin-
ery relatively more costly. In turn, this will lead the demand for production
factors to shift in favor of unskilled labour. This adjustment mechanism will
persist till the factors relative price will come back to the original level. In
other words, the model predicts that the higher the substitutability between
low-skill labour and automation, the less sensitive relative wage will be to
local changes in skill mix induced by immigration.
Both theories have been tested by the empirical literature, and what fol-
lows tries to review them. One of the first attempt to measure the relative
contribution of the two effects – change in output mix and change in pro-
duction technology – is that of Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002). The two
authors examine the change between 1982 and 1992 in value added in the
low-skilled sector, as well as the change in capital investments and labour
productivity, by regressing the various dependent variables on a measure of
immigration to US states. Because of the concern that the measure of output
used – value added – can cofound changes in price and quantity, the change
in fraction of employment in the low-skilled sector is also examined. The
results indicate that immigration inflows do not affect output mix between
low- and high-skilled manufacturing industries across states. However, it
appears that the fraction of employment in low-skilled manufacturing indus-
tries has slightly increased and at the same time productivity has risen more
slowly in states that received more immigrants relative to other states.
The study of Hanson and Slaughter (2002) arrives to different conclu-
sions. The two authors suggest an exercise for examining the labour-market
adjustment in open economies – a decomposition of state factor-supply changes
into portions due to changes in traded and non-traded output and to national
and state-specific changes in industry production techniques. In particular,
in each state factor-market equilibrium implies:
V = CX (2.12)
where V is a vector of factor supplies, X is a vector of outputs, and C is a
matrix of unit factor requirements (industry production techniques). Taking
the first differences, they obtain:
∆V = C¯∆X + ∆CX¯ (2.13)
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where C¯ and X¯ represent across-time means of unit factor requirements and
outputs. The first term of the right-hand-side of equation indicates output
mix changes, while the second term expresses production-techniques changes.
In order to distinguish between output adjustment in traded and non-traded
sectors and to separate changes in production technique attributable to na-
tional general shocks from those idiosyncratic to a state, the authors further
decompose (3.2) and they get:
∆V − (C¯∆XNT + ∆CX¯NT ) = C¯∆XT + ∆CGX¯T + ∆CIX¯T (2.14)
The quantities presented in the previous decomposition are measured
with data on employment and value added by state, industry, and educa-
tional category. The resulting descriptive analyses indicates that "[...] state
change in employment are accommodated largely through generalized changes
in production techniques and through changes in the output mix of traded
good. State-specific changes in production techniques, in contrast, play a rel-
atively small role in factor absorption."8 Unfortunately, the study lack of
an inferential analyses and a more rigorous exam is conducted only on the
correlation between state technologies to corroborate the importance of gen-
eral technological changes in factor-supply shocks absorption. Nonetheless,
besides the numerous limitation of the model, the analytical decomposition
introduced has shown the way for further empirical analyses.
A more refined version of the just analysed decomposition is offered by
Lewis (2003). It uses only data on employment and it allows to better identify
the two distinct effects because it ignores any measures of value added. We
review here the example presented in Card and Lewis (2007).
Let sd(c) being the fraction of dropout workers employed in city c. By
definition, it is equal to:
sd(c) =
1
N(c)
∑
i
Ndi (c) (2.15)
where N(c) is the total employment in city c and Ndi (c) is the number of
dropouts employed in industry i in city c. We can rewrite the definition in
(2.15) as:
sd(c) =
1
N(c)
∑
i
Ndi (c) =
∑
i
Ni(c)
N(c)
Ndi (c)
Ni(c)
=
∑
i
λi(c)s
d
i (c) (2.16)
where λi(c) is the employment share of industry i in city c and sdi (c) is the
share of dropout workers in industry i in city c. It follows that the gap
between the share of dropouts employed in city c and the national mean can
8see Hanson and Slaughter (2002) p. 19
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be rewritten as a sum of a between-industry (or extensive) component, B(c),
a within-industry (or intensive) component, W (c), and an interaction term,
I(c). In formula:
sd(c)− sd = B(c) +W (c) + I(c) (2.17)
where
B(c) =
∑
i
sdi [λi(c)− λi] (2.18)
W (c) =
∑
i
λi[s
d
i (c)− sdi ] (2.19)
I(c) =
∑
i
[sdi (c)− sdi ]× [λi(c)− λi] (2.20)
The traditional effect predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin model is captured
all by the between-industry component. In other words, an increase in the
share of dropout workers in an area is absorbed by a growth in the employ-
ment share of low-skilled industries. On the contrary, following the model by
Lewis (2011), we expect to measure a more important within-industry effect,
that is an increase in the relative fraction of dropouts in each industry.
In order to evaluate the realtive weight of the two effects, Card and Lewis
(2007) estimate a series of cross-city regressions of the form:
B(c) = aB + bB[s
d(c)− sd] + eB(c)
W (c) = aw + bW [s
d(c)− sd] + eW (c)
I(c) = aI + bI [s
d(c)− sd] + eI(c)
Because equation (2.17) holds an identity, the coefficients bB, bW , and
bI sum to one. The estimated values are respectively 0.22, 0.76, 0.02, re-
vealing that most of the migrant inflows to US states have been absorbed
by city-specific-within-industry increase in the use of unskilled labour. On
the contrary, HO-style changes in industry structure have played a relatively
small role.
The question "how do new vacancies are created when supply shocks oc-
cur?" is also at the center of the study conducted by Dustmann and Glitz
(2015). The focus is posed at the firm level. Within an industry, hetero-
geneous firms operate, meaning that they produce the same output with
different technologies. With this in mind, it easy to imagine that a scale
adjustment between firms can be confounded with a factor intensity ad-
justment within an industry. This occurs if the rate of growth of a firm
is correlated with the production technology used. At the aggregate level
the contribution of new firms entering the production process and that of
dying firms leaving it is also ignored. Therefore the decomposition offered
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by Lewis (2003) should be estimated at the unit level. This is exactly what-
Dustmann and Glitz (2015) do. Furthermore, they take into account also
the price effect, that is the variation in wages. More precisely, the authors
estimate trough a regression model the effect of immigration on wages sep-
arately for the tradable and non-tradable sector. What emerges is that in
the non-tradable sector the effect of a migration inflow on the wage of the
similar educated group of workers is significantly negative. In that sector the
price effect totally absorb the supply shock and there is no changes in output
mix or in production technology. On the contrary, the estimated effect of
immigration on wages in the tradable sector is effectively null. Therefore a
further analysis of the labour demand response is possible and necessary.
The distinction between the tradable and the non-tradable sector appears
to be fundamental in studies that try to estimate the effect of immigration
on the domestic labour market conditions. The effect on wages and unem-
ployment depends critically on the good market structure and an analyses
that focuses only on the degree of competition in the labour market is at
least short-sighted.
From the estimation of the decomposition by Lewis (2003) at the firm
level with social security record data in Germany, Dustmann and Glitz (2015)
conclude that 70% of the change in skill-mix employment is absorbed by
changes in relative factor intensities, and another 18.1% by the contribution
of new firms. One explanation for this last effect can be due to the fact
that the use of a more labour-intensive technology can allow small firms
to overcome credit constraints. Indeed, if some inefficiencies exist in the
absorption of labour supply shocks, they can be addressed also to the credit
market. Nonetheless, before analyzing it, the production decisions of firms
have to be studied more carefully. The economic literature is still at an early
stage and there is ample room for further researches.
2.6 Conclusions
Based on the reviewed contributions, it is useful to make some concluding re-
marks. In particular, in order to give some policy suggestions, we summarize
the results of the existing literature making explicit the consequences of the
immigration shock for each group involved in the adjustment process. The
first one, obviously, is composed by the native workers. Their labour market
opportunities and conditions are the main subject of all the cited papers.
The common conclusion is undeniably a greater wage dispersion after the
migration shock. Nevertheless, it worth noting that an analysis of the causal
relationship between migration and the wage inequality indicates immigra-
tion to be not the major responsible of the increased wage gap witnessed in
the last decades (Card, 2009).
The debated point in the literature is the immigration effect on the aver-
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age wage. The studies reporting a positive or null effect, among which that
of Peri and Sparber (2008), are based on the idea that immigration induces
native to specialize. Thanks to a greater productivity, they get a higher
wage. The results of other analyses (e.g Foged and Peri, 2016) suggest that
the specialization pattern does not occur within the same firms for which
natives worked before the immigration shock. Although, it takes place first
by loosing the job and later by finding one better. This is why the policy
conclusions of these studies are in favour of a more flexible labour market
which can thus spread this positive effect. The underlying hypothesis is that
inefficiencies reside only in the labour market, while in the goods market
everything works as expected. Actually, the crucial assumption for a null
effect of immigration on the average wage is the perfect elasticity of capital
supply. Various studies have analysed the effect of immigration on the wages
of native workers separately for the tradable and non-tradable sector (Borjas
and Ramey, 1995; Cortes, 2008), clearly characterized by a different degree
of competition between firms. Only the first one follows the "Factor-Price-
Equalization" hypothesis, while in the second one the adjustment process
occurs through wages. The reaction of investments to labour supply shocks,
or more in general the change in the labour demand, is not yet well studied
and there is ample room for further research.
The second group involved in the adjustment process following the migra-
tion shock is that of foreign workers. Every analysis agrees on the fact that
they face worse conditions because of the increased competition in the labour
market. Nevertheless, many authors seem not to be concerned. They con-
clude that foreign workers can gain in terms of social networks and anyhow
they get a greater wage with respect to that in the origin country (Ottaviano
and Peri, 2008). We have already stressed that this conclusion has the limit
to not consider the economic and political consequences that can emerge
because of a segmented society.
The third group is that of capital owners. From the analysis of the
existing literature, what convince us most is that the labour demand ac-
commodates the labour supply by a more intensive use of the relative more
abundant factor – the low-skilled workers. Instead, the adjustment through
an increase in the output of low-skilled firms seems a lesser important ef-
fect. From the theoretical point of view, we can expect the opposite only
if the immigration shock induces also a change in the aggregate demand.
Nonetheless, the redistribution of income from the more disadvantage part
of the distribution – with a higher marginal propensity to consume – to the
more advantage contradicts this hypothesis.
To conclude, the increased inequality for native workers, the greater
poverty and the social segregation of the foreign population, the possible
exploitation of power positions by firms or the inefficient reaction of the de-
mand side of the labour market, all needs the intervention of the policy maker
that cannot leave the market to freely adjust to the shock. In particular, it
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is required to foster the economic and social inclusion of the newly arrived
by means of integration policies, in education and in the labour market. The
labour conditions of low-skilled natives need to be enhanced through labour
market policies and investments must be encouraged to foster the economic
growth.
48
Chapter 3
The Labour Demand Response
to Supply Shocks. The Indirect
Effect of Immigration
The economic literature is debating from long time on the identification
of the impact of immigration on native wages and recent studies seem to
validate the result of an average null effect. Nonetheless, the adjustment
mechanisms of the labour market need to be further analysed. In particular,
we want to study how firms respond to an increase in the foreign labour
supply, focusing on the Italian case. We contribute to the ongoing debate by
replicating the methodology of Dustmann and Glitz (2015) with RIL data – a
firm-level panel dataset on Italian firms. The aim of the study is to measure
to which extent the labour demand accommodates to a supply shock with an
increase in the total production or with the adoption of more labour-intensive
technologies. Our result – obtained with an instrumental variable approach –
shows that the second effect is dominant. In line with the reference literature,
the result holds in particular for the manufacturing sector, while in sectors
less-exposed to international competition we can suppose a greater effect on
prices than on quantities.
I would like to thank Francesco Bloise (Sapienza University of Rome) for the valuable
help with the data.
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3.1 Introduction
The current refugee crisis, which is challenging all the Western economies,
demands from researchers a more profound knowledge of the determinants
and the potential effects of the phenomenon. Among the challenges that
such a big movement of people may pose for the receiving country, there is
the effect of foreign-born individuals on the domestic labour market. The
economic literature is debating from long time on the identification of the
impact of immigration on native wages and recent studies seem to validate
the result of an average null effect (e.g Foged and Peri, 2016). Beyond the
heterogeneity of this impact on different groups of workers and along the dis-
tribution of wages (Card, 2009; Dustmann et al., 2013), also the adjustment
mechanisms of the labour market need to be further analysed. In particular,
we want to study how firms respond to an increase in the foreign labour
supply, focusing on the Italian case.
We contribute to the ongoing debate by replicating the methodology
of Dustmann and Glitz (2015) with data from Rilevazione longitudinale su
Imprese e Lavoro (RIL) – a firm-level panel dataset that contains numerous
information about employment and investment of the Italian firms. Italy has
long been an emigration country – during the century 1876-1976, 24 millions
people left the country and such a big flow has been called the Italian exodous.
Mainly due to the return of its citizens, at the end of ’70s Italy registered for
the first time a slightly positive net migration. At that time no constraints
on entry existed. The first mass immigration that affected Italy was at the
beginning of the ’90s, when the Eastern Bloc collapsed and thousands of
Albanians crossed the Italian borders. Due to its geographic characteristics,
which make Italy very close to Eastern European countries and the arrive
of the Mediterranean routes, in that period immigration started to increase
also from North Africa. Nowadays refugees coming from Maghreb are at the
center of a strongly debated European plan for relocation. Although Italy
represents for most asylum-seekers only a landing country, immigration in
general increases tremendously from 2007 (OECD, 2017), making Italy a
noteworthy case study.
To our knowledge we are the first to study the labour demand adjustment
mechanisms in Italy with the use of the decomposition method proposed by
Hanson and Slaughter (2002). Furthermore, we are the first – together with
Dustmann and Glitz (2015) – to implement it at the firm level, making
our estimates more representative. The aim of our study is to measure to
which extent the labour demand accommodates to a supply shock with an
increase of the total production or with the adoption of more labour-intensive
technologies.
The channels through which we can observe an increase in the labor
demand are two. First, the greater availability of unskilled workers can in-
duce labor-intensive industries in expanding their production. This is a well
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known result of the international trade theory (i.e. Rybczynski effect). Sec-
ond, due to the substitutability between unskilled labor and some kind of
capital, the increase in the supply of low-skilled workers can lead to an en-
dogenous technological change that is capital-saving. In other words, after a
migration shock we should observe a more intensive use of unskilled labour.
Our result – obtained with an instrumental variable approach (Card, 2001)
– shows that the second effect is dominant. From 2005 to 2010, low-skilled
immigration increased the number of low-skilled workers employed by the
Italian firms while the total employment remained quite stable. In line with
the reference literature, the result holds in particular for the manufactur-
ing sector, while in sectors less-exposed to international competition we can
suppose a greater effect on prices than on quantities.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the
existing studies on the labour demand reaction to an increase in the for-
eign labour supply. In section 3.3 we illustrate the analytical framework
and the empirical strategy. In section 3.4 we present the data and some
descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 includes the empirical results and section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
One of the main issue of the economic debate on the impact of immigra-
tion on the destination labour market has been the effect of foreigners on
native wages. Beginning with Borjas (2003), the workhorse of all the sub-
sequent studies has been a standard CES production function – where the
labour-factor combines the contributions of workers who differ in education,
experience, and potentially immigrant origins. The various disaggregations
of L lead Borjas (2003) and Borjas et al. (2008) to find a negative effect of
foreign labour supply on native wages, while Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008)
a positive one. The two analyses diverge also because of different assump-
tions made on the supply of capital – fixed the first and perfectly elastic the
second. Furthermore, Peri and Sparber (2008) show that the aforementioned
positive effect originates because immigrants induce native to specialize in
occupations that incorporate more complex tasks (for example tasks that re-
quire communicative abilities). So that this pattern accomplished, the total
output has to increase and similarly the supply of capital.
Various papers are dedicated to the reaction of capital to an increase in
the immigrant labour supply. They relate on a more consolidated literature
on the complementarity between labour and capital (e.g. Doms and Lewis,
2006) and we are going to review them briefly. Nonetheless, the results
remain controversial and our analysis wants to shed new light on the issue,
adding some empirical evidence with an important new case study.
According to the existing literature, after a shock that changes the skill
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composition of the domestic workforce we can observe two potential effects:
an increase in the output of industries that use more intensively the relative
more abundant factor or an endogenous technological change that implies
a general more intensive use of the relative more abundant factor. We can
refer to the former as the extensive effect and to the latter as the intensive
effect.
One of the first attempts to measure the relative importance of the two
adjustment channels is that of Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002). The
authors consider a panel dataset of US low-skilled industries covering the
period from 1982 to 1992. The linear regressions implemented for various
indicators of the industry performances – such as average value added, capital
investments, labour productivity and the fraction of employment – highlight
firstly no effect of immigration on capital investments and on value added.
The latter variable can confound effects on quantities with effects on prices,
so the fraction of employment is also analysed. The results show a positive
effect of immigrant labour supply on the fraction of employment in low-
skilled industries and also a negative effect on productivity. Specifically, the
labour productivity has risen more slowly in those States that received more
immigrants during the period under analysis.
A similar methodology is used by De Arcangelis et al. (2015) for a panel
dataset of the Italian provinces (NUTS3). The IV regressions shows that the
manufactures’ value added was positively affected by foreign-born workers
during 1995-2006. Nonetheless, this measure of the industry performance
needs the underlying hypothesis that output prices and wages are given to
be reliable.1 This is a credible assumption with regard to the tradable sector
– which is exposed to the international competition. Firms in it take advan-
tage of every opportunity of extra-profit. On the contrary, in the no-tradable
sector the labour market adjust to a supply shock reaching a new equilib-
rium with a lower wage. This is clearly demonstrated by Cortes (2008) and
Dustmann and Glitz (2015).
Hanson and Slaughter (2002) suggest an alternative analytical framework
to examine the labour market adjustment in open economy – a decomposi-
tion of factor-supply changes into components due to change in output and
change in production technology – that has been proposed again by differ-
ent authors in more refined versions. According to Hanson and Slaughter’s
results the first effect is dominant, while Lewis (2003) indicates the second
as the more relevant one. Card and Lewis (2007) suggest that most of the
immigration flows to US States have been absorbed by a within-industry
increase in the use of unskilled labor. On the contrary, HO-style changes in
industry structure have played a relatively small role. All these studies relate
to the US labour market and many others implemented the same methodol-
1The insensitivity of native relative wage to immigration in Italy is tested in appendix
(see Arcangelis et al. (2015) p. 58)
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ogy to different case studies – Gandal et al. (2004) for Israel, Gonzalez and
Ortega (2011) for Spain and Dustmann and Glitz (2015) for Germany.
Nonetheless, heterogeneous firms operate within industries, meaning that
they produce the same output with different technologies. With this in mind,
it is easy to imagine that a scale adjustment between firms can be confounded
with a factor intensity adjustment within an industry. This occurs if the
rate of growth of a firm is correlated with the production technology used.
Therefore the suggested decomposition should be estimated at the unit level.
This is exactly what Dustmann and Glitz (2015) do in their analysis for
the German labour market in the period 1985-1995. The estimated results
confirm a greater role of the intensity effect.
The contribution of the present paper is to implement the suggested
decomposition at the firm-level for the Italian case. In the next section we
are going to illustrate it in details.
3.3 The Analytical Framework
Following the related literature, the analysis of the various adjustment chan-
nels of the labour market to a supply shock stars from the decomposition of
the equilibrium condition:
X =
J∑
j=1
Cj(w,Aj) Y j (3.1)
where X is a vector of factor supplies, Cj is a vector of unit factor
demands and Y j is the output of production unit j. Clearly, the demand
depends from factor prices w and the technology used Aj .
Totally differentiating (3.1), we obtain all the possible adjustment mech-
anisms through which the labour demand accommodate to a supply shock:
dX =
J∑
j=1
dCjw(w,A
j)Y jdw +
J∑
j=1
dCj
Aj
(w,Aj)Y jdAj +
J∑
j=1
Cj(w,Aj)dY j
(3.2)
In other words, after a change from the supply side, the equilibrium is
reached again through three different channels or three potential effects of
immigration.
First, an impact on wages, which can be defined as the redistributive
effect. The average wage decreases and the labour market reaches a new
equilibrium along the demand curve. Firms employ labour at lower costs
and this situation may become stable in case of scarse competition in the
goods market. Cortes (2008) and Dustmann and Glitz (2015) – focusing on
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the non-tradable sector – find this result. On the contrary, for the tradable
sector we can suppose that the Factor Price Equalization hypothesis holds
and thus we should observe an upward shift of the labour demand curve.
This is coherent with the negligible effect of foreign labour supply on native
wage and it is due to the following two (alternative) mechanisms.
Second, an impact on the technology used, which can be defined as the
intensity effect. Given the relative abundance of low-skilled labour, firms
adopt in general more labour-intensive technologies. This effect is common
to all firms in the tradable sector and it is not industry-specific. From a
theoretical point of view, this is represented by a rotation of the isoquant
in favour of a relative more intensive use of labour, while the slope of the
isocost remains unchanged. More specifically, the slope of the isocost is due
to the average wage, which – under the FPE hypothesis – is fixed. However,
the relative wage of the more abundant skill-group of workers decreases and
it induces a technological change.
Third, an impact on production output which can be defined as the scale
effect. Thanks to the comparative advantage of labour-intensive industries,
firms in these sectors may increase their output. Similarly to the previous
effect, this implies a new labour-market equilibrium with an higher employ-
ment and the same level of wage. Theoretically, this translates in an upward
shift of the isocost and the allocation of production to an higher isoquant.
The well-known result of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade
theory predicts exactly this effect.
We focus on the tradable sector, in which the first channel is effectively
null. Therefore, we can rewrite (3.2) for a particular skill-group i as follows:
dXi
Xi0
=
J∑
j=1
CjY j
Xi0
dCj
Aj
Cj
+
J∑
j=1
CjY j
Xi0
dY j
Y j
(3.3)
where Xi0 represents the labour supply of skill-group i in the base period,
while the other variables hold the same meaning.
The common term C
jY j
Xi0
represents the demand for labour type i in pro-
duction unit j over the total supply of skill-group i at the base period. It can
be approximated by αji0 =
Xji0
Xi0
, that is the relative employment of skill-group
i in production unit j in the base period. In other words, we weight the con-
tribution of each firm by its relative size with respect to total employment.
Similarly, we approximate
dCj
Aj
Cj
≈ ∆X
j
i
Xj
, namely the percentage change the
employees of skill-group i relative to total employment in production unit
j, and dY
j
Y j
≈ ∆Xj
Xj
, that is the percentage change of total employment of
production unit j. Thus, equation (3.3) becomes:
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∆Xi
Xi0
=
J∑
j=1
αji0
∆Xji
Xj
+
J∑
j=1
αji0
∆Xj
Xj
+
J∑
j=1
Rji (3.4)
Where the first component shows the intensity effect, the second the scale
effect, and the Rji is the residual term and it represents the interaction of the
other two.2 The empirical strategy that we are going to illustrate in what
follows will try to assess the relative importance of the two channels.
3.3.1 The Empirical Implementation
We proceed now by regressing each component of the previous decomposition
on the relative change of labour supply. In other words, in order to evaluate
the relative importance of the various adjustment channels we relate them
one to one with the variation in the local labour market supply – the left-
hand side of the equilibrium decomposition. We consider the local labour
market as relative to a specific region and a particular industrial sector. So
for instance, the equation for the scale effect is given by:
J∑
j=1
αji0
∆Xjrs
Xjrs
= ψi + ρr + σs + β1
∆Xir
Xi0,r
+ ir (3.5)
The total change in employment of region r and sector s, weighted for
the relative employment of skill-group i in the base period, is related to the
variation of skill-group i supply in region r and sector s. ψi, ρr, and σs are
skill-group, region, and sector fixed effects, capturing the heterogeneity of
worker, geography, and sector units. ir is the error term. β1 represents the
proportion of the supply shock that is absorbed by a change in the relative
size of firms, i.e. what we have called the scale effect.
The same estimating equation is then implemented for the other two
channels – the intensity effect and the residual term. In the first case, the
dependent variable becomes the relative change of employees of skill-group
i and in the second one the interaction of the other two components. The
underlying decomposition – which holds as identity – makes the estimated
coefficients to sum to one. Therefore each regression coefficient expresses
the relative contribution of the various mechanisms in absorbing local labour
market supply shocks.
The level of the analysis is the Italian regions (NUTS2), sectors are distin-
guished by ATECO07 system, and workers are divided in three skill-groups:
low-, medium- and high-skilled. The first includes high-school dropout work-
ers, the second is the group of high-school graduates and the third encom-
passes who attended the college. Regressions are estimated using the OLS
method.
2For the derivation of the labour market equilibrium decomposition see Appendix A
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3.3.2 The Identification Strategy
What we have to notice is that from both sides of the estimating equations
(see e.g. equation 3.5) we have the same variable, but differently specified.
This implies that by construction the independent variable is endogenous
to the model and the estimated coefficients have no statistical meaning. To
overcome the limit of the OLS method, we can use an instrumental variable
approach. The idea is that of making use of the well-known network instru-
ment proposed by Card (2001) in order to capture only the exogenous part
of supply shock induced by immigration.
In general, this instrumental variable is applied in migration studies to
predict the current immigrant share with the past one. There are various
issues that make the present immigration a biased regressor. For instance,
immigrants can locate where the labour demand is growing so that a com-
parison between areas with different immigration share would show no effect
of foreign labour force on labour market outcomes. The same applies to our
specific case – immigrants can locate in expanding regions, so that there
could be a spurious correlation between the current immigration in a region
and the performance of firms in the same area.
A common feature of migration flows is that the new immigrants tend to
settle where previous immigrants already live (Bartel, 1989). Sharing expe-
riences and information about the new place of residence are all advantages
that reduce the cost of movement. We can then use the past location to
predict the exogenous part of current immigration – that part that depends
from the network between people and not from the actual conditions of local
labour markets.
In formula, our instrument is defined in the following way:
zir =
∑
c λcrθci∆Ic
Xi0,r
(3.6)
The current probability of being of skill-group i and living in region r is
proportional to the probability of belonging to ethnic group c and living in
region r in 1991, λcr, and to the probability of belonging to ethnic group c
and being of skill-group i in the current period, θci. ∆Ic is the actual flow
of immigrants of ethnicity c and Xi0,r is the skill-group i labour-supply in
the base period. Differently from most papers that share this instrumental
variable, we use it in the first stage to regress the overall labour-supply.
The exogeneity of the instrument relates to the specific history of the
phenomenon. From one hand, the current flow is calculated on the years
2005-2010. This is a very crucial period for the Italian immigration history.
Indeed, as explained before, in 2007 immigration increased tremendously –
because of the agreement of free movement of workers from Bulgaria and
Romania (OECD, 2017) – making our case study an important occasion to
evaluate the impact of an immigration shock. On the other hand, the base
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period has to refer sufficiently in the past, so that to consider the previous
immigrant location independent from current local conditions. We have cho-
sen the year 1991. The beginning of the ’90s – consequently the collapse of
the Eastern Bloc – is the period when Italy faced for the first time a mass
arrival. From that date to the present, two important policy shocks changed
significantly the legislation on immigration, so that they make our instru-
ment reasonably exogenous to the current conditions. In 1998, temporary
residence centers were established to deter illegal immigration. Immigrants
who arrived in Italy without a Visa were held and were not allowed to freely
move on the territory. The legislation became even more strict in 2002, when
the possibility of an immediate expulsion was set up.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main dataset used to implement the analysis is the Rilevazione longitu-
dinale su Imprese e Lavoro (RIL), a panel dataset provided by the ISFOL
research centre. It contains detailed information on the employment, invest-
ments, and other characteristics of Italian firms. We consider the years 2005
and 2010 for the aforementioned motives and we keep only firms that are
present in both waves. This is because if a firm exits the sample we can-
not distinguish the death of that firm from attrition. Similarly, when a new
firm enters we do not know if it is a newly constituted firm or just a newly
sampled one. The survey concerns approximately 22,000 firms and the panel
size of the sample is about half of the full size. It is representative of the
Italian firms in all industrial sectors apart from agricultural. We focus on
the tradable sectors, expecially on manufacturing, so we can neglect it.
More specifically, by firm we know the total number of employees and the
number of employees for each skill-group. Skills are identified by occupations
and divided in three groups. We do not know the ethnic origin of immigrant
workers. Therefore, in order to define our instrumental variable we take data
of another survey – the Rilevazione sulle Forze Lavoro. It is provided by the
Italian National Statistics Institute from the 2004 every three months. We
consider the first quarter both for 2005 and 2010. In this dataset skills are
defined by the education, grouped in order to be coherent with the skill
classification of the main dataset.
Immigrants are divided in nine ethnic groups, which distribution in terms
of importance and skill is reported in tables (3.1) and (3.2). As expected,
the most numerous groups are those of Central-Eastern Europe and North
Africa.
Ethnic groups are classified based on the categories of the other dataset
that we use – the Italian census data. In it we can find information about
the allocation of immigrants in 1991.
In general, around 90% of the Italian immigrants falls in the low-skilled
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of immigrant ethnic groups, 2005
Share of Immigrants Low-Skilled Medium-Skilled High-Skilled
Central and Eastern Europe 36.36 93.56 1.58 4.85
North Africa 18.21 94.07 2.17 3.75
Asia 14.43 92.77 0.75 6.48
Africa others 7.31 93.10 1.97 4.93
Central and South America 7.16 88.94 2.01 9.05
Europe 12 6.70 60.22 5.38 34.41
Europe others 5.47 71.05 6.58 22.37
North America 2.59 81.94 . 18.06
Europe EFTA 1.76 73.47 4.08 22.45
All Immigrants 100.00 89.06 2.16 8.78
Author’s elaboration on RCFL (ISTAT) 2005
Table 3.2: Characteristics of immigrant ethnic groups, 2010
Share of Immigrants Low-Skilled Medium-Skilled High-Skilled
Central and Eastern Europe 43.25 94.41 1.43 4.16
North Africa 14.86 93.19 1.24 5.57
Asia 14.67 90.50 2.06 7.44
Europe others 8.67 81.67 3.64 14.70
Central and South America 6.65 86.76 2.57 10.67
Africa others 6.41 94.88 1.02 4.10
Europe 12 3.60 58.39 4.01 37.59
North America 1.27 88.66 1.03 10.31
Europe EFTA 0.60 63.04 4.35 32.61
All Immigrants 100.00 90.51 1.84 7.65
Author’s elaboration on RCFL (ISTAT) 2010
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group, therefore we can argue that the analysis highlights especially the
mechanisms of absorption of unskilled workforce.
From 2005 to 2010 immigration to Italy increased substantially. Looking
at the last row of table (3.3) we can notice that immigration rate has more
than tripled from 2005 to 2010. In the last column of the same table the rate
of growth of immigration is shown. With respect to the Italian workforce in
2005, immigration has increased by roughly 4 p.p.. Between regions there
is a huge variance both in the share of immigrants and in its variation.
Immigrants has settled mainly in the Centre-North of Italy. This is clearly
depicted in figures (3.1) and (3.2).
Table 3.3: Immigration Rate by Region (Labour Force)
2005 2010 2010-2005
Piemonte/Valle d’Aosta 2.61 9.73 5.72
Lombardia 3.54 12.76 7.04
Trentino Alto Adige 4.04 11.04 5.29
Veneto 4.97 11.81 4.83
Friuli Venezia Giulia 5.09 10.30 4.66
Liguria 3.17 7.81 3.10
Emilia Romagna 4.11 14.49 7.63
Toscana 3.46 11.94 7.44
Umbria 4.48 14.30 7.30
Marche 3.55 10.27 7.13
Lazio 2.62 9.12 5.02
Abruzzo 1.44 6.68 3.48
Molise 0.38 2.06 1.17
Campania 0.89 3.18 1.43
Puglia 0.76 1.94 0.92
Basilicata 0.33 1.40 0.94
Calabria 0.71 3.44 2.23
Sicilia 0.72 2.13 1.19
Sardegna 0.39 1.41 1.14
All 2.44 8.26 3.79
Observations 117991 105607 223598
Authors’ elaboration on RCFL-ISTAT 2005 and 2010.
Firms operating in the tradable sector have grown during the period
under analysis – passing from about 53 employees per firm to more than 65.
Looking at the skill composition of them, we notice the relevant proportion
of unskilled workers and the decrease in the percentage of high-skilled (table
3.4). This is even more exacerbated in the non-tradable sector (table 3.5).
These two features offer some insights for both effects, so in the next section
we will try to empirically evaluate them.
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Figure 3.1: Immigration rate of Italian regions (NUTS2) in 2005
Figure 3.2: Immigration rate of Italian regions (NUTS2) in 2010
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Table 3.4: Characteristics of firms in non-tradable sector
2005 2010
Average size 53.19 65.26
(509.09) (587.09)
% low skill 44.98 48.14
(36.91) (39.60)
% medium skill 45.03 47.13
(37.08) (37.75)
% high skill 9.99 4.73
(18.73) (12.42)
Observations 3970 4160
Authors’ elaboration on Isfol-Ril: 2005,2010. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table 3.5: Characteristics of firms in tradable and non-tradable sector
2005 2010
Average size 51.43 61.25
(403.50) (472.53)
% low skill 46.20 58.27
(35.47) (36.04)
% medium skill 45.20 37.77
(35.41) (34.08)
% high skill 8.60 3.96
(17.27) (10.73)
Observations 6979 6979
Authors’ elaboration on Isfol-Ril: 2005,2010. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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3.5 Empirical Results
Tables (3.6) and (3.7) report the main results of our empirical analysis which
has still ample room to be enanched. The OLS specification suggests that
the labour supply variation has been absorbed by the increase in the pro-
portion of low-skilled employment. More specifically, we can say that from
2005 to 2010 firms absorbed two thirds of the change in the labour supply
because of a more intensive use of unskilled workers. Output growth has
contributed to employ the remaining variation of the labour supply. As we
explained before, the result has not any statistical meaning, so that we have
to implement an IV estimation strategy in order to empirically assess which
of the two theoretical effects has prevailed. The IV estimate reinforces previ-
ous results and we conclude that the labour supply change induced firms to
adopt more capital-saving production technologies. In this case, the instru-
mental variable specification allows us to capture only the exogenous part of
the supply shock generated by migration flows. This is why we can call it
the "indirect effect of immigration".
Table 3.6: Decomposition of Changes in Labor Supply at the Firm Level.
Tradable Sector
[Firm Scale Effect] [Firm Intensity Effect] [Residual Term]
OLS 0.29** 0.64*** -0.01
[0.13] [0.07] [0.10]
R-squared 0.340 0.631 0.199
Obs. 390 390 390
Notes:All regressions include a full set of skill and province fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
(1/N05rs + 1/N
10
rs )
−1/2 , where Nrs represents overall employment in tradable
industries in region r and sector s in year t. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The results refer to the tradable sector, in which firms are exposed to
the international competition. Certainly, the most narrow definition of the
tradable sector corresponds to the manufacturing sector. So, to better iden-
tify the model, we replicate the analysis only for firms in the manufacturing
industries and regression outputs are illustrated in tables (3.8) and (3.9).
Our main results are confirmed by both estimates, which are comparable to
those of Dustmann and Glitz (2015). However, differently from us they can
identify new constituted firms which have played some role in absorbing the
new labour supply.
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Table 3.7: Decomposition of Changes in Labor Supply at the Firm Level.
Tradable Sector
[Firm Scale Effect] [Firm Intensity Effect] [Residual Term]
IV 0.07 1.02*** -0.09
[0.05] [0.12] [0.13]
R-squared 0.292 0.498 0.188
Obs. 390 390 390
Notes:All regressions include a full set of skill and province fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
(1/N05rs + 1/N
10
rs )
−1/2 , where Nrs represents overall employment in tradable
industries in region r and sector s in year t. The first-stage F-statistic of the
instrument is 22.969. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.8: Decomposition of Changes in Labor Supply at the Firm Level.
Manufacturing Sector
[Firm Scale Effect] [Firm Intensity Effect] [Residual Term]
OLS 0.13** 0.57*** 0.10**
[0.05] [0.11] [0.05]
R-squared 0.400 0.640 0.236
Obs. 333 333 333
Notes:All regressions include a full set of skill and province fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
(1/N05rs + 1/N
10
rs )
−1/2 , where Nrs represents overall employment in tradable
industries in region r and sector s in year t. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.9: Decomposition of Changes in Labor Supply at the Firm Level.
Manufacturing Sector
[Firm Scale Effect] [Firm Intensity Effect] [Residual Term]
IV 0.05 1.02*** -0.09
[0.04] [0.12] [0.13]
R-squared 0.378 0.502 0.159
Obs. 333 333 333
Notes:All regressions include a full set of skill and province fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
(1/N05rs + 1/N
10
rs )
−1/2 , where Nrs represents overall employment in tradable
industries in region r and sector s in year t. The first-stage F-statistic of the
instrument is 21.810. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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3.5.1 Robustness Checks
Using more capital-saving technologies can be necessary to overcome liquid-
ity constraints. So, we can argue that the results obtained in the previous
section is driven by small firms, that are likely those which encounter more
difficulties in attracting investment capitals. Furthermore, they are also an
important part of the Italian business sector. On the contrary, big firms
that dispose of greater financial resources can react with an increase in in-
vestments. To assess if the effect can be heterogeneous along the size distri-
bution of companies, we restrict the analysis only to firms with more than 15
employees. The OLS and IV regression outputs – presented in tables (3.10)
and (3.11) – are both similar to the baseline so that we can claim that the
result is robust for the entire sample.
Table 3.10: Decomposition of Changes in Labor Supply on the Firm Level.
Tradable Sector
[Firm Scale Effect] [Firm Intensity Effect] [Residual Term]
OLS 0.14 0.76*** 0.05
[0.11] [0.23] [0.13]
R-squared 0.289 0.706 0.080
Obs. 336 336 336
Notes:All regressions include a full set of skill and province fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
(1/N05rs + 1/N
10
rs )
−1/2 , where Nrs represents overall employment in tradable
industries in region r and sector s in year t. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.11: Decomposition of Changes in Labor Supply on the Firm Level.
Tradable Sector
[Firm Scale Effect] [Firm Intensity Effect] [Residual Term]
IV 0.03 1.10*** -0.20**
[0.03] [0.11] [0.09]
R-squared 0.238 0.575 .
Obs. 336 336 336
Notes:All regressions include a full set of skill and province fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
(1/N05rs + 1/N
10
rs )
−1/2 , where Nrs represents overall employment in tradable
industries in region r and sector s in year t. The first-stage F-statistic of the
instrument is 14.209. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
A final interesting test can be conducted to evaluate the goodness of fit of
our estimates. Indeed, we have supposed that in the tradable sector the effect
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on wages is negligible while in the non-tradable is dominant. To offer some
evidence to support these hypotheses, we decided to replicate the analysis
for all the firms – both in the tradable and in the non-tradable sector. In
other words, we realize a placebo test. Because of the confounding effect
of firms in the no-tradable sector, we should observe no impact of supply
shocks on the adjustment mechanisms considered since so far. Nevertheless,
our instrument is to weak to let us take into account the test results (see
tables 3.12 and 3.13).
Table 3.12: Decomposition of Changes in Labor Supply on the Firm Level.
Tradable Sector
[Firm Scale Effect] [Firm Intensity Effect] [Residual Term]
OLS 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.05
[0.09] [0.09] [0.13]
R-squared 0.293 0.318 0.215
Obs. 435 435 435
Notes:All regressions include a full set of skill and province fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
(1/N05rs + 1/N
10
rs )
−1/2 , where Nrs represents overall employment in tradable
industries in region r and sector s in year t. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.13: Decomposition of Changes in Labor Supply on the Firm Level.
Tradable Sector
[Firm Scale Effect] [Firm Intensity Effect] [Residual Term]
IV 0.72*** 0.69** -0.43
[0.26] [0.28] [0.32]
R-squared 0.045 0.136 .
Obs. 435 435 435
Notes:All regressions include a full set of skill and province fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by
(1/N05rs + 1/N
10
rs )
−1/2 , where Nrs represents overall employment in tradable
industries in region r and sector s in year t. The first-stage F-statistic of the
instrument is 2.08. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
3.6 Conclusions
Existing studies on the impact of immigration on native labour market out-
comes have tentatively concluded that on average native wages are not nega-
tively affected by immigrant labour supply. How labour market clears is still
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to be examined in depth and we try to give some evidence on the adjust-
ment mechanism at work. We want to appraise two alternative hypotheses.
First, from international trade theory we learn that the increase in the sup-
ply of one production factor induces industries that use it more intensively
to expand their output. The result is a change in the output mix between
industries. Second, a technological change in favour of the relative more
abundant factor could occur after a supply shock. In this case, industries
can adopt production technologies that incorporate a more intensive use of
unskilled labour.
To implement our analysis we follow Dustmann and Glitz (2015). Ac-
cording to their analytical framework, an increase in the total employment
of firms reflects a growth of the output, while an increase in the proportion
of low-skilled workers points at a technological change. Similarly to them,
our investigation is at the firm level. Indeed, within industries different firms
with different production technologies operate. Consequently, an increase in
the proportion of unskilled employees originated by the output growth of
more labour-intensive firms can be erroneously interpreted as a support of
the second potential effect. Furthermore, another possible bias originates
from the endogenous increase in the labour supply. To overcome this limit
and capture only the exogenous part of the supply shock we use an instru-
mental variable approach. We replicate the network instrument proposed by
Card (2001), so the current growth in the local labour supply is related to
the past allocation of immigrant workers.
Based on the ISFOL-RLIL dataset covering the period 2005-2010, our re-
sults show that half of the foreign labour supply has been absorbed through
a capital-saving technological change, while the rest of the mechanism re-
mains unexplained. In addition, the premise of our analysis is that this
effect emerges only if we consider the tradable sector, where international
competition between firms realizes the factor price equalization. So, we ex-
pect to observe a stronger effect when we focus on a narrower definition of
the tradable sector, i.e. the manufacture. Our regression outputs point in
this direction, but they have be enhanced. On the contrary, the main result
is slightly weaker when we consider only big firms. Indeed, we can suppose
that small firms tend to invest less because of a more limited ability in at-
tracting capital. Anyway, evidence in favour of the intesity effect is robust
also to this model specification.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature by offering new
evidence on the important case-study of Italy. Previous studies concerned es-
pecially the US labour market. Nevertheless, the current European situation
deserve a specific analyses and ours is the first using a firm-level dataset.
In conclusion, some policy considerations have to be made. An important
body of the literature (e.g. Peri and Sparber, 2008; Foged and Peri, 2016)
concluded that in order to have a non negative effect of immigration on
wages, the labour market has to be sufficiently flexible to allow native workers
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to specialize in more productive occupations. Whereas, our analyses would
put some attention also on the degree of competition between firms and
their propensity to invest. Indeed, to have a reshuffle of occupations and
let immigrants to be employed in low-skilled jobs, the total output has to
increase. In other words, we should find a strong extensive effect. Anyhow,
also in this case we should be worried not only of labour market flexibility
but also to integration and redistributive policies in order to mitigate the
risk of marginalisation.
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Appendix A
The labour market equilibrium
decomposition
We decompose the percentage variation of employment of skill-group i in the
tradable sector as follows:
∆Xi
Xi0
=
∑
j
Xji0
Xi0
∆Xji
Xji0
=
∑
j
αji0
∆Xji
Xji0
(A.1)
Let Yj be a measure of the size of firm j (e.g. the total employment of
firm). Then for each firm the term ∆X
j
i
Xji0
can be expanded into:
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Xji0
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Xji
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(A.6)
which che be rewritten as:
∆Xji
Xji0
=
∆Y j
Y j0
+
∆Xji
Y j
Xji0
Y j0
+
∆Yj
Y j0
×
∆Xji
Yj
Xji0
Y j0
(A.7)
Putting A.7 into A.1 we get:
∆Xi
Xi0
=
∑
j
αji0
∆Y j
Y j0
+
∑
j
αji0
∆Xji
Y j
Xji0
Y j0
+
∑
j
αji0
∆Yj
Y j0
×
∆Xji
Yj
Xji0
Y j0
(A.8)
which recalls the decomposition of labour market equilibrium given by
eq. (3.4) in par. (3.3).
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